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Abstract. Carl Schmitt was an intellectual who made the discipline of international 
law grapple with the major issues of his time. His work as an international lawyer 
remains largely untranslated. It is riddled with racism and anti-Semitism. However, 
an interest of his work is that it reflects the ‘shadow side’ of contemporary international 
law, forgotten because the moral defeat of Germany in 1945 was so total. 
Schmitt argues for an inherent tendency to violence and demonization in Western 
liberal international law theory and practice. He argues for the acceptance of difference 
as against homogeneity in world society as the only way to limit this violence. 
Finally, he argues that the liberal tradition is fundamentally compromised by its own 
colonialist heritage. Its objections to Nazi Germany translating this colonialist 
imperialism onto Eastern Europe are incoherent. Schmitt’s avowed racism and anti- 
Semitism remain shocking. The article does not try to downplay this aspect of his 
work. However, it is worth noting that his Nazi bosses, for the most part, thought his 
racism insincere. If any negative spirit imbues the actual technical detail of Schmitt’s 
work it is his aversion to the West. This probably had its roots in the envy which the 
Kaiserreich had of the British, French, and American Empires while Schmitt was 
growing to maturity. 
 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
Carl Schmitt’s writings on international law during and immediately after 
the Third Reich will be taken here as a heuristic device to introduce a 
number of issues to do with international law in the Third Reich. Perhaps 
the most important, of continuing interest, is whether Schmitt’s critique 
of political (and legal) liberalism, if carried over into international law, 
had the effect of undermining the integrity of the discipline. This is because 
Schmitt’s critique of liberalism enjoys at present considerable interest 
outside of Germany.1 The central feature of liberalism is taken here to be 
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1. See G.L. Ulmen, American Imperialism and International Law – Carl Schmitt and the US 
in World Affairs, 72 Telos 43 (1987). Telos continues to render a service in explaining 
Schmitt’s views on international law in the period considered by this article. See, in 
particular, 109 Telos 54–109 (1996), for a translation of Chapter II of Schmitt’s 1950 
publication Nomos der Erde, titled The Land Appropriation (translations by G. Ulmen and 
K. Walker); C. Schmitt, Der Nomos der Erde im Völkerrecht des Jus Publicum Europaeum 
(1950). See also, in the same issue, the review of another book by Schmitt: H. Quaritsch, 
Carl Scmitt’s Das International-rechtliche Verbrechen des Angriffskrieges unter der 
Grundsatz “Nullum Crimen Nulla Poena Sine Lege,” 109 Telos (1996). 
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the view that a legal order has effectively devised general rules or norms 
that determine clearly the relationship of the freedom of individual legal 
subjects to one another. 
Critical legal theorists fiercely criticize this paradigm for international 
law. They regard liberalism as ambiguous about the relationship of individual 
legal actors to one another. They say that claims of individuals 
conflict and that liberalism, for better or for worse, excludes any concept 
of authority standing over individuals which could resolve these conflicts.2 
Schmitt appears to reduce all law to the capacity of a would-be sovereign 
to judge a state of emergency or exception.3 A question, for a historian 
of international law, is whether Schmitt applied his ‘antinomianism’ 
systematically to international law and whether the critical international 
law theorist then finds himself in ‘strange company.’ 
The response which will be given here as to the place of Schmitt’s 
critique of liberalism in his international law theory is that, with considerable 
but not decisive reservations, he did introduce a fundamental feature 
of Nazi thinking into international law, that of a Weltanschauung. He 
insisted that instead of a global, if formal, world order, governed by 
abstract, in the sense of not person or subject-oriented, legal norms, world 
society be divided, as also national society, among those who share subjectively 
held ‘world views.’ These are value-systems which explain for 
themselves how to give sense to lives but which cannot be translated into 
opposing ‘world views’ and which therefore necessitate a radical relativisation 
of the international order. These concepts of world order are, of 
course, liberalism, national socialism, and communism/bolshevism.4 The 
least clear of these concepts is national socialism itself. Schmitt’s work 
has to be understood as part of a struggle within the Nazi regime to determine 
the meaning of the regime’s ideology. The continuing challenge of 
Schmitt’s theory is precisely that highlighted by critical theory. 
If Law is really a subjectively held Weltanschauung then the elimination 
of the Weltanschauungen opposed to liberalism still does nothing to 
strengthen the epistemological credibility of the latter. The international 
legal order still rests upon subjectively held assumptions about the 
individual in society. Those who hold such assumptions effectively coerce 
 
2. A review of this literature is offered in A. Carty, Critical International Law: Recent Trends 
in the Theory of International Law, 2 European JIL 66 (1991). In my view this literature 
comes from within the liberal tradition and lacks any historical sense. See further, A. Carty, 
Liberalism’s Dangerous Supplements: Medieval Ghosts of International Law, 13 Michigan 
JIL 161 (1991). 
3. The intention is to come back to Schmitt’s general theory of law in a second, critical part 
of this study. In the first part there will be merely an excursus made at a number of points 
where this is thought essential to an understanding of the exposition of Schmitt’s international 
law ideas. 
4. A very well known contemporary typology of international law in terms of the differing 
Weltanschauungen is the product of a seminar at the Frankfurt Law Faculty in 1938: see 
F. Giese & E. Menzel (Eds.), Vom deutschen Völkerrechtsdenken der Gegenwart (German 
International Law Thinking at Present), at 52–143 (1938). 
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others to accept them in the same way as any group asserts an ideological 
hegemonic dominance.5 This is quite a different interpretation of the 
universal legal order than the self-representation of legal liberalism. At 
present it is probably the case that apart from Arab and Islamic fundamentalism, 
the only challenge to legal liberalism is from the very weak 
Law and Development movement, which tries to object to the effects on 
the less developed world of the liberalization of the world economy.6 This 
is still an appropriate level at which to object to liberalism. However, to 
anticipate Carl Schmitt’s arguments about Grossraumordnung (order of a 
large space), there is no major Power which defends the developmentalist 
ideology. Given the present world dominance of legal liberalism in international 
society, it is of considerable value to understand precisely what 
was defeated with the extinction not merely of the Third Reich, but also 
of its ‘international law tradition.’ 
If one were only to consider the impact of his work on the 
Grossraumordnung, one might claim that Schmitt was the most renowned 
international lawyer of the Third Reich. It has to be said that, at least within 
Germany, if one is to write of Carl Schmitt, one will be expected to be 
either for or against him. In the field of international legal study one can 
say that professional German international lawyers do not accept the study 
of Schmitt as a respectable topic of study. The one major study of his work 
is by a legal historian.7 It represents a courageous attempt to establish 
important principles of scholarship for the study of Schmitt as an international 
lawyer in the period of the Third Reich but it does not purport to 
argue, as will be done here, that Schmitt’s work is very useful for an understanding 
of the development of the international law discipline as a whole. 
One has to be realistic that this raises, at least in Germany, the question 
of where does the author ‘stand’ in relation to Carl Schmitt? The response 
has several aspects. 
Perhaps the most important is that Schmittian national socialist critique 
of international law provides an indispensable historical perspective for 
an understanding of the liberal international legal order. This is meant in 
the sense that the discomfort that Schmitt arouses makes it possible to treat 
him, virtually standing on his own, as the shadow side of the post-war 
(1945) international law of peace, human rights, and democracy in the 
 
5. This is appreciated in the excellent article by Ulmen (American Imperialism), supra note 
1. Ulmen considers Schmitt from a general perspective of critical theory (in the sense of 
ideological critique), including Schmitt’s post-World War II writings. The aim is to see 
what light this throws on American perspectives. The present study has the more limited 
aim to approach Schmitt’s work from an international law perspective, especially with 
respect to the nature and political implications of Schmitt’s Nazi associations. 
6. See, e.g., A. Carty, Liberal Economic Rhetoric as an Obstacle to the Democratization of 
the World Economy, 98 Ethics 742 (1988); and A. Carty, Third World Claims to Economic 
Self-determination: Economic Rights of Peoples, Theoretical Aspects, in P. de Waart & E. 
Denters (Eds.), The Right to Development in International Law 43 (1992). 
7. M. Schmoeckel, Die Grossraumtheorie (1994). 
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Western world.8 This is, at least, because he did not recant from the 
positions that he held during the Third Reich, except in his personal 
estimation of Hitler. He refused to be denazified. As such Schmitt serves 
as a focal point for the numerous other German international lawyers who 
did recant, or simply changed their song, after 1945.9 
The question then arises: what kind of legal history is being written 
here? Is it an attempt to explain how Nazi international law was possible? 
Is it an attempt to expose the extent to which, despite appearances, the 
Nazi doctrine and practice have influenced international law today? Is it 
an attempt to read into the defeat of Nazi international law an onward 
march into a global victory for a liberal concept of international law? Is 
it a purported objective analysis of what Schmitt really meant in the 
context in which he lived? 
My view is that it is not possible to look at the past quite apart from 
the demands of the present. The historian, legal historian, or whatever, is 
not some kind of disembodied spirit who can look at the past apart from 
where he is himself.10 I have endeavored to explain the perspective from 
which I approach this subject. It is a mixture of dissatisfaction with present 
international law, from a critical legal standpoint, a respect for the technical 
competence of Carl Schmitt as an international lawyer, a determination 
to try grasp at what it was like to write international law in Hitler’s 
Germany, and a decision to explore a subject because it has made resistance 
to liberalism so much more difficult. 
 
 
 
 
 
2. CARL SCHMITT’S WRITINGS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW DURING THE NAZI REGIME 
 
 
2.1. Introduction 
 
I will limit my scope largely to Schmitt’s writings during the period of 
the Third Reich. To some extent there will be mention of post-1945 
comments by Schmitt on his writings, but the technical limitations of 
 
8. The ‘shadow’ is also a favourite theme of the deconstructive wing of critical legal studies: 
see, e.g., P. Fitzpatrick, The Abstract and Brief Chronicles of the Time: Supplementary 
Jurisprudence, in P. Fitzpatrick (Ed.), Dangerous Supplements, at 1 (1991). 
9. See the very comprehensive survey of this phenomenon by D.F. Vagts, International Law 
in the Third Reich, 84 American JIL 661 (1990); see also M. Messerschmidt, Revision, Neue 
Ordnung, Krieg, Akzente der Völkerrechtswissenschaft in Deutschland 1933–45 (Revision, 
New Order, War and Trends in the Science of International Law in Germany 1933–1945), 
Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen 61 (1971). Here numerous names of prominent German 
and Austrian international lawyers appear, such as Menzel, co-author of an already cited 
work from 1938, Verdross, Berber, Dahm, and Scheuner. 
10. All of these possibilities are canvassed thoroughly by M. Stolleis, Recht im Unrecht (1994), 
36 at 54–55 (Vorurteile und Werturteile der Rechtshistorischen Forschung zum 
Nationalsozialismus). Stolleis himself prefers the last option of those mentioned above. 
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writing an article and not a book mean even here that the choice of a 
limited number of post-1945 writings will appear arbitrary. The essential 
interest remains in how did Schmitt write international law during the time 
of the Regime? A further limitation that is self-imposed is that I am not 
specifically interested in Schmitt’s opposition to the Versailles Treaty.11 
Obviously many of these texts appear after 1933. They are clearly 
related to the subject, if only because the resentment against the Treaty 
must have determined Schmitt’s sympathy for the Nazis. However, within 
this short study, I wish to see how far he developed a specifically Nazi 
concept of international law in response to this undoubted resentment.12 
Finally, I am not attempting here a review of Schmitt’s liberalism critique.13 
What I have to say is relevant to this critique, but is not limited to it. I 
approach the topic with a specific international law interest, which is that 
National Socialism has, at least as much as Soviet communism, made any 
serious resistance to the liberal conception of international law virtually 
impossible. I have no interest to playing down Schmitt’s association with 
the Regime. With all of these qualifications, I am in absolutely no doubt 
that Schmitt’s international law writings are quite simply good, and merit 
careful exposition without an overload of afterthought. 
Hence the first part of this paper attempts to set out his views. There 
is only contextual elaboration, in the form of an excursus, wherever this 
is thought absolutely essential for an international lawyer to understand 
what Schmitt is saying. The criticism that I have to make comes in the 
second section. 
The assumption in the already existing critical literature is that there 
were from 1933 definite stages in the history of National Socialist international 
law doctrine during the Third Reich. In particular Schmoeckel 
writes that it has become usual to distinguish Nazi international law writing 
into three periods: 
1. 1933–1935, where a natural law doctrine of basic rights prevailed; 
 
11. His writings on this topic are collected in C. Schmitt, Positionen und Begriffe im Kampf 
mit Weimar – Genf – Versailles 1923–1939 (Positions and Concepts in the Struggle with 
Weimar, Genf, Versailles 1923–1939) (1988). 
12. In conversation with the author, Günter Maschke has contended that crucial to an 
understanding of Schmitt is his (Schmitt’s) mistaken assumption that Germany had no choice 
but to sign the Versailles Treaty. The outcome was inevitably a self-hatred, the result of a 
self-imposed humiliation. 
13. See K. Hansen & H. Lietzmann (Eds.), Carl Schmitt und die Liberalismuskritik (1988), esp. 
G. Maschke, Drei Motive im Anti-Liberalismus Carl Schmitt, at 69–73. Maschke considers 
Schmitt’s foreign affairs and international law writing exclusively from the perspective of 
his Weimar anti-liberalism, without any reference to his adherence to Nazi ideology. The 
same is true of his Forward to his recently edited collection of Schmitt writings: See G. 
Maschke (Ed.), C. Schmitt: Staat, Grossraum, Nomos, at xiii–xxvii (1995). Maschke 
confines himself to distinguishing Schmitt from other Nazi writers without directly 
addressing Schmitt’s clear support for the Nazi Regime as such as an effective response to 
anglo-american universalism. 
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2. 1936–1939, where a racist doctrine came first; and 
3. 1939–1945, where a theory of Grossraum had the centre stage.14 
 
This has the merit that it corresponds to three phases in Nazi foreign 
policy: the winning back of full sovereignty, the policy of establishing 
national ethnic boundaries, and the Grossraum period.15 I do not follow 
this scheme because my main interest is to explore Schmitt’s own attachment 
to Nazi ideology, which appears to have been immediate. Furthermore, 
his work on the Grossraum (Völkerrechtliche Grossraumordnung) 
will be considered before his work on the concept of war (Die Wendung 
zum discriminierenden Kriegsbegriff ) (the turn to a discriminating concept 
of war), although it comes after it chronologically and was presented as 
a completion of it, i.e. Schmitt’s alternative to the English and French call, 
which Schmitt criticizes, for international institutions as the way forward 
in the development of international law. The reason for this non-chronological 
ordering of Schmitt’s work is that, approaching it as an international 
lawyer, I see it as preferable in systematic terms to consider his 
vision of a National Socialist international order before I approach in detail 
the opposition which he expected it to arouse. It appears to me that there 
is more premonition of coming war in his discussion of the concept of war 
than in his discussion of the concept of Grossraum. So, the Wendung zum 
discriminierenden Kriegsbegriff leads more logically to a discussion of his 
specifically wartime texts. Another crucial international law text, Der 
Nomos der Erde (the nomos of the earth) was written during World War 
II, although published in 1950. It will only be considered here in one 
respect, the collapse of the idea of a European international law. The reason 
for this is not a matter of space. I would simply accept that by the time 
of finishing the book Schmitt had given up interest in developing a 
specifically National Socialist concept of international law. The part of the 
book I consider is nonetheless presented because it gives a picture of the 
mess in which Schmitt thinks liberalism leaves international law, notwithstanding 
the failure of National Socialism. 
 
 
2.2. National Socialist Weltanschauung and international law 
 
2.2.1. Excursus I 
 
The concept of Weltanschauung is so closely associated with National 
Socialism as to be now discredited. However, it is worth noting that Karl 
Jaspers, himself an exile from the Regime, devoted an early major study 
to the topic. This is not to say that one can simply jump from Jaspers to 
Schmitt. However, Jaspers does provide a starting point for an epistemo- 
 
14. Schmoeckel, supra note 7, at 112, drawing upon E. Bristler, Die Völkerrechtslehre des 
Nationalsozialismus (International law doctrine of National Socialism) (1938). 
15. Id. 
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logical consideration of Schmitt’s theories by explaining how they 
resemble subjectivist tendencies deep in the history of German thought. 
Jaspers places his considerations within the context of his eventual development 
of an existential (also subjectivist) philosophy. The concept, 
Weltanschauung, belongs firmly within German idealism. This tradition’s 
founder, Immanuel Kant, is held by Jaspers as originally responsible for 
the doctrine that ideas have a subjective character.16 Fichte and Nietzsche 
who both see a philosophy as a personal creed (Selbstbekenntnis) of its 
originator accentuate this subjectivity. The type of philosophy a man 
chooses shows what he is for a man, says Fichte.17 Given the great confusion 
of so-called philosophical systems at the time of writing in 1919, 
Jaspers endeavors to unravel what associations of ideas most genuinely 
express the totality of individual perspectives. This means giving priority 
to those ideas which are really held, and which represent a total vision of 
the subject. This is not to say that everyone really holds such perspectives, 
but the philosophy which is evolving towards existentialism looks first to 
distinguish what is held as a matter of conviction from what is held 
casually and, second, to what serves to distinguish a firm personality from 
one which allows itself to be dispersed in different directions.18 
It is obvious that such a type of intellectual inquiry makes a direct 
connection between the person and the subject matter and has built into 
it an inquisitorial function. A psychological approach will always look 
with distrust behind the subject matter to the person.19 It is hardly an 
accident that discussions about Weltanschauungen prove to be acrimonious, 
as has already been hinted at in the Introduction. 
In 1934 Schmitt published an article called Nationalsozialismus und 
Völkerrecht, which is presented as a lecture which he gave on 18th July 
1934. The Party formally printed that it had no reservations about anything 
in the text.20 Schmitt begins his lecture by insisting upon the importance 
of the subjective dimension for international law. It is the inner form/type 
of a People (Volk), which is the basis and precondition for the character 
of inter-state relations. When a People as essential to the international 
law community as the German People change their form/type, this must 
have serious implications for the international legal community.21 Schmitt 
begins his attack on liberalism at once with an insistence upon the insights 
that can be won from the new National Socialist perceptions of the German 
People. The type (Art) of a community depends upon the type of its 
 
16. K. Jaspers, Psychologie der Weltanschauungen, at 12 (1919), referring also to an Appendix 
titled Kants Ideenlehre (Kant’s Doctrine of ideas), at 465–486. 
17. Id., at 38. 
18. Id., at 35–37. 
19. Id., at 38. 
20. C. Schmitt, Nationalsozialismus und Völkerrecht (1934). 
21. Id., at 1. 
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members. The connection between international law and Weltanschauung 
is made exactly as one might expect from Jaspers: 
So it follows that the Law of inter-state relations and associations does not develop 
from abstract-normativist, rule-oriented thinking, but rather from a concrete Order 
of a particular kind, which has evolved its particular character from certain states 
and peoples […].22 
It is to the Nazi Movement (Bewegung) that one owes the realization that 
Law rests upon a ‘substanzhaften Ordnungsdenken’ (substantive thinking 
about order). Law is a matter of a correct relationship with the concrete 
existence of a People. There is no separation of the juridical Norm from 
the People’s right to life (völkisches Lebensrecht).23 
Schmitt proceeds to identify the post-1918 (Versailler Diktat) international 
law as arising from a liberal, positivist, and therefore abstract-normativist, 
rule-oriented Weltanschauung. This goes back to the 19th 
century and has coercion (Zwang) as its central feature. Law is a matter 
of procedures that compel observance of norms. In terms of international 
law this perspective means some states take it upon themselves to compel 
observance of norms by other states. The ‘Vienna School’ of international 
law has perfected this theory so as to hide the fact that some states are 
coercing others. It means that rules, somehow above states, can be imposed 
down upon them, a normative system that imposes itself, apparently 
impartially, but in fact hierarchically in opposition to the concrete order 
of existing Peoples. So, in Schmitt’s view the liberal Vienna School fits 
perfectly alongside the imperialism of the Versailles Treaty regime. So the 
role of Weltanschauung is decisive. The system which Germany finds 
oppressive can be explained “entirely and exclusively in terms of the 
command of a particular, holy Weltanschauung of Versailles Imperialism, 
with its pacifist and liberal-democratic political way of thinking […].”24 
It can be said, in Schmitt’s view, that German international legal science 
has fallen into the same way of thinking. It cannot be said, with very few 
exceptions, 
[t]hat the entire German science of international law has shown an unwavering 
legal conviction, with the certainty of self-assurance, in a genuine spiritual self-defense, 
as has [the legal science of] other smaller peoples, such as the Hungarians 
[…].25 
There are at least three important respects in which Schmitt carries forward 
his lecture. At the same time as outlining its logical coherence, it is 
important not to lose sight of the rhetorical force and propaganda inten- 
 
22. Id. (all translations are the author’s). 
23. Id., at 7. 
24 Id. 
25. Id., at 11. 
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tion of the lecture. Schmitt argues convincingly that the whole normative 
structure of international law, based upon treaties, is emptied of content 
because of the reservations which states make. He refers in particular to 
the Geneva (Draft) Protocol, the Locarno Agreement and the Kellogg- 
Briand Pact. These reservations by states express a return of the hard and 
repressed fact that Law can only be based on the concrete lives of states.26 
An aspect of this inevitable subjectivity, where states decide themselves 
in practice whether their very existence is threatened, is that more powerful 
states can subvert the so-called normative, treaty based, order to determine 
that their weaker opponents are aggressors or delinquents. This is a 
legalization of war, a dressing up of aggressive action as peacekeeping 
measures.27 
Schmitt’s intention is to show the ever-weakening legitimacy of the 
League. So, even if it could be said that at the beginning the League of 
Nations had some ‘Soul’ as expressing Wilson’s liberal democratic and 
humanitarian ideology, this is lost when a bolshevist state such as the 
Soviet Union and fascist Italy, not to mention the eastern European 
regimes, are together in the League. The latter then becomes an opportunist 
alliance and “no longer a genuine community […].”28 Schmitt takes 
away the legitimacy of the League, weakening the Versailles system, by 
denying that it serves universal values in practice. At the same time, he 
says that Germany should not allow itself to be tricked into appearing 
as an outlaw state, which denies the binding character of a universal 
international law and treats the sovereign state as superior to international 
law. Germany objects instead, at a technical level, to the mistaken liberal 
perspective that Law has to be a coercive system with organs capable of 
enforcing rules against recalcitrant parties, with sanctions, especially where 
the British and the French dominated League will provide the organs to 
carry out these sanctions.29 
At the same time Schmitt calls for a rejection of the positivist Geist 
(Spirit) of 19th century international law doctrine, i.e. of Kaiserreich 
Germany. To preach a doctrine of unlimited state sovereignty will only 
inspire suspicion among Germany’s neighbors at a time when (1933–34) 
Germany is the weaker party. It is Germany that is likely to suffer the more 
from such lawlessness implicit in a return to the legal theory of the jurist 
of the pre-war period, such as Zorn.30 This rhetorical style of hurt 
innocence builds up its own momentum when Schmitt protests additionally 
against the model of relations of the Soviet Union with the West in 
the years after 1917 as a model for Germany. That would stress absolute 
state sovereignty so as to loosen ties with other countries. 
 
26. Id., at 23–25. 
27. Id., at 21. 
28. Id., at 25–28. 
29. This is a comment on a work generally criticised by the Nazis, namely L. Schecher, 
Deutsches Aussenstaatsrecht (German External Public Law) (1933); id., at 15. 
30. Schmitt is following the official line. See Bristler, supra note 14, at 63–71. 
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We belong to the legal community of European peoples […]. We cannot be 
excluded or excommunicated from the community of European peoples[…]. 
Whoever will excommunicate the German people, excommunicates only himself 
[…].31 
 
Despite the firm appeal to an National Socialist Weltanschauung which 
calls for international law to be grounded in the existential, echte 
Lebensrechte of Peoples (genuine living rights), the content which Schmitt 
gives this Law is an appeal to the traditional pre-1914 doctrine of the basic 
rights of states, their Grundrechte, above all, of course, the right of self-defense, 
and the right of an equal capacity for self-defense.32 He recognizes 
that doctrinally there is nothing original here. He appeals to a 
well-recognized international law tradition.33 
This fact raises acutely the question whether the whole so-called dimension 
of a Weltanschauung is purely rhetorical. This can be answered only 
when Schmitt’s theories of international law have been comprehensively 
reviewed. Here, the preliminary point will be noted that the reference to 
Grundrechte of states is an appeal to a pre-1914 liberal tradition of international 
law, to pre-institutional (effectively pre-League of Nations) rights 
which were accorded by liberal legal theory to states as in a virtual state 
of nature and as an expression of their natural freedom. It will stress the 
relativist aspect of the philosophy of Weltanschauung that Schmitt holds 
to. Also the predominance of the doctrine of basic state rights will be an 
indication of the preoccupations of one particular state as the 1930s unfold. 
All of this corresponds to dominant and representative National Socialist 
international law doctrine.34 
 
 
2.3. Völkerrechtliche Grossraumordnung 
 
There are numerous further occasions where Schmitt develops his attack 
on the League of Nations.35 However, these negative criticisms of the lack 
of homogeneity in international institutions should give way to the, as it 
were, positive vision of an international order that Schmitt offers. This 
vision is derived from his Nazi theory of the nature of Law. The key text, 
Völkerrechtliche Grossraumordnung, also begins with the insistence that 
international law is a personal law, a Law of Peoples (Recht der Völker). 
It is a ‘konkrete Ordnung’ which depends on the fundamental 
‘Ordnungsprinzip,’ the principle of the self-determination of peoples (Das 
 
31. Schmitt (Nationalsozialismus und Völkerrecht), supra note 20, at 17. 
32. Id., at 8. 
33. “For us it is now a matter of returning to this pure source of international law thinking 
recognised by all sound international lawyers in the past […].” Id. 
34. Bristler, supra note 14, at 71–108. 
35. See, in particular, C. Schmitt, Die siebente Wandlung des Genfer Völkerbund, in Schmitt 
(Positionen und Begriffe), supra note 11, at 210–213. 
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Selbstbestimmungsrecht der Völker).36 Schmitt opposes not only the 
concept of People to State but also contrasts a ‘konkreten Grossraum’ to 
a ‘konkrete Raumordnung’ (concrete order of space). It will be necessary 
to refer back to Schmitt’s earlier writing, in 1934, on the concept of 
‘Konkretesordnungsdenken’ (concrete order thinking). However, it is better 
first to introduce clearly how this latter concept appears in his international 
law thinking. 
Schmitt begins by repeating his view that there is no concept of Raum 
(Space) in international law because it is dominated by what he calls a 
Vertragspositivismus (treaty positivism), which is the equivalent of the 
Gesetzpositivismus (legislative positivism) of liberalism at the domestic 
level of the state. He does not elaborate here in further detail on this 
concept. So another Excursus will be necessary. 
 
2.3.1. Excursus II 
 
In the 1920s Schmitt elaborated fully his criticism of legal normativism 
as applied to state and law. The starting point is the significance of such 
expressions as “governance of Laws not men,” government “in the name 
of the Law,” and “equality before the Law.”37 It is bound intimately with 
the victory of the European liberal middle classes, particularly after 1848, 
with the central place for parliamentarianism.38 The legislation approved 
after free and intelligent discussion in Parliament should have a general, 
abstract character but, at the same time, should be sufficiently clear and 
definite to allow of fairly automatic application without recourse to 
excessive judicial or executive discretion. This legal-political history is 
the origin of the normative approach to Law. All that one needs to add is 
the coercive element. The Law in this sense of Loi or Gesetz does need 
to be backed by a sanction which can be all the more automatic in that it 
should be pretty clear when there have been violations of the Law. 
Effectiveness of the norm/Law means that such sanctions follow regularly 
in the event of violations. 
The implications of this approach to Law for international law hardly 
require a paragraph. Legislation is a product of the will of Parliament. The 
fundamental source of such Law-making at the international level can be 
described as the will of the State. The primary source of international law 
now becomes treaties that are intended to function as law-making conventions. 
States express their wills in law-making conferences, intending 
not merely to conclude treaties as commercial or political bargains but also 
 
36. C. Schmitt, Völkerrechtliche Grossraumordnung, mit Interventionsverbot für raumfremde 
Mächte (International law of the Greater Space, with a Prohibition of Intervention for Powers 
Foreign to the Space), at 7 (1997). 
37. See, e.g., C. Schmitt, Legalität und Legitimität (1932), included in C. Schmitt, 
Verfassungsrechtliche Aufsätze (Constitutional Law Essays) 263 (1958), at 264 et seq. 
38. C. Schmitt, Die geistige Lage des heutigen Parlamentarismus (The Intellectual Situation of 
Contemporary Parliamentarianism), at 10 (1923). 
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to edict general rules of conduct for the international community. 
Inevitably, it will be supposed that since Law requires a sanction at a 
national level some kind of international substitute for a sanction can either 
be found or be supposed to exist. 
Schmitt clearly presents his opposition to Gesetz/Vertragspositivismus in 
the strongest possible Nazi terms. Positivism’s abstract lack of attachment 
to place, or to any natural relationship to concrete ground, and its 
willingness to construct an international legal order which consists of 
equally abstract delimitations of competence, is all particularly attributable 
to Jewish influence. It is a particular characteristic of Jewish existence 
that any ‘natural relationship with concrete Land/ground’ is missing. 
Kelsen and others are held responsible for having transformed the concept 
of state territory (in their definition of the state in international law) from 
being the ground for a settled People (dem Boden eines sesshaften Volkes), 
into nothing other than the simple sphere of competence of a legal order.39 
This criticism is no accidental part of Schmitt’s thinking. It repeats the 
themes of the seminar which he organized in 1936, Das Judentum in der 
Rechtswissenschaft (‘Jewishness’ in legal science) and, in particular, the 
contribution of Norbert Guerke on the influence of Jewish theorists, 
especially Kelsen, on international law.40 Schmitt stresses as well the role 
of the work of Walter Hamel in providing the most thorough theoretical 
resistance to this emptying of the concept of territory.41 Schmitt has 
to stress this aspect of his theory of international law, if it is to be 
possible to insist on a non-universalist concept to oppose to liberal 
Vertragspositivismus. 
Schmitt is going to differentiate his position from colonial-imperialist 
arguments about international law and land, which might argue, for 
instance, that more heavily populated areas may have territorial claims 
on less populated areas. A demographic claim may have a basis as a 
legal claim, but it cannot provide a specific foundation for a konkretes 
völkerrechtliches Grossraumprinzip which by itself, essential to the 
character of Konkretesrechtsdenken, can provide its own clear limits and 
standards.42 Schmitt consistently rejects a geopolitical concept of 
Grossraum, as argued by Karl Haushofer, in favor of an argument which 
links space and a political idea. This idea will have a People as its standard-bearer. 
For it to be a political idea, the People carrying it must find 
themselves in opposition to another idea. Here Schmitt insists, again, upon 
the relevance of his understanding of the concept of the Political, which 
 
39. Schmitt (Völkerrechtliche Grossraumordnung), supra note 36, at 12–13. 
40. See the discussion of this seminar and references therein in A. Carty, Interwar German 
Theories of International Law, 16 Cardozo LR 1235 (1995), esp. at 1245–1251. 
41. Schmitt (Völkerrechtliche Grossraumordnung), supra note 36, at 13, referring to W. Hamel, 
Das Wesen des Staatsgebiets (The Nature of State Territory) (1933). 
42. Id., at 15–16. 
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supposes ideas in opposition. His concept of Grossraum is tied to a triad 
of Land, People, and Idea that he opposes to liberal universalism.43 
Recalling the opposition of the American Monroe Doctrine to the Holy 
Alliance of Prussia, Russia, and Austria at the beginning of the 19th 
century, Schmitt now insists, in the spirit of struggle and conflict which 
is central to his concept of the Political, that the position of the expansionist 
Holy Alliance is now occupied by the ‘liberal idea of freedom of 
the western democracies.’ It represents a commitment to the legality of 
the status quo, and gives to actual world possessions the sanctity of the 
principle of Legality, as well as of Legitimacy. These principles have 
shaped the international order throughout the waging of the World War I, 
and represented a determination by Western powers to impose globally 
their democratic parliamentarian ideology, making a complete connection 
between the external and internal affairs of states. The war was a form of 
intervention, in which the Western powers treated as central to their aims, 
the imposition of their form of government on enemy powers. This is the 
context in which Schmitt thinks it necessary to develop a theory of nonintervention 
in connection with a new German-style Monroe Doctrine.44 
Far from wishing to adopt or to imitate the Monroe Doctrine, Schmitt 
is conscious that it has now become historically obsolete. Since at least 
the time of Theodore Roosevelt, the United States has abandoned its 
concrete, geographically, and historically located theory of Grossraum, 
in favor of a general, universalistically conceived World Principle. This 
latter has a clear economic function that is the imperialism of ‘dollar 
diplomacy.’ Imperialism and capitalism go together. With President 
Wilson, by 1917 a sound (because concrete and spatially definite) 
Ordnungsdenken has been dissolved into an expansionist, economic imperialist 
universalist ‘world-Idea,’ which is taken to justify an unlimited 
authority for intervention.45 
 
 
2.3.2. Excursus III 
 
This is the point at which it is felt appropriate to introduce Schmitt’s 
concept of Konkretesordnungsdenken and to explain how it is seen as 
opposed to the liberal concept of normative, rule-based legality. Schmitt 
needs to link his Grossraum theory to this theory of Law because, 
somehow, the theory has to indicate how it will accept limits upon itself, 
required by space and people. How is this so? At present the intention is 
merely to provide the minimum of explanation of Schmitt’s ideas so as to 
understand better how he develops his international law theory. The 
question how far Schmitt could impose such ideas on Nazi orthodoxy will 
have to be treated more thoroughly at a latter stage. 
 
43. Id., at 32–34. 
44. Id., at 36. 
45. Id., at 36–39. 
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Once again Schmitt opposes Jewish and Germanic thinking. There are 
peoples without land or state or church who exist only for the Law, for 
normativist thinking. There are others, such as medieval Germans, for 
whom a concrete order is more attractive. This accommodation of typical 
NS thinking includes the usual party line that the reception of Roman Law, 
from the 15th century, worked in favor of abstract normativism.46 Schmitt 
is clearly opposing himself to what he has consistently regarded as a 
fetishism of Law. Law cannot simply define, apply or interpret itself. The 
idea of Law, Nomos, supposes a concrete order and a concrete community. 
He quotes Hoelderlin at length that the Nomos is the figure in which Man 
finds himself in his own presence and meets God; and the Law of the State, 
including the statutes inherited for a long time, conserves, with more rigor 
than Art, the living conditions in which a people finds itself.47 There is 
no doubt that Schmitt sees a link between this thinking and medieval 
Germany, where Aristotelean-Thomist thinking understood the world as a 
series of hierarchies of essences and orders, a way of thinking which has 
survived in Germany.48 He connects this tradition with Luther who also 
saw Law as arising from the status people enjoyed as a mother, judge, 
soldier etc.,49 until one reaches the general status of the German People. 
The Germans as a People are the focus of the concerns of its philosophers 
since the beginning of German idealism. The objective idealism of 
Hegel is Konkretesordnungsdenken, while Fichte understood the notion 
of Reich as the most German concept of order. Schelling perfected this 
by linking the cosmic concepts of organism, Weltanschauung, and myth, 
all drawn back to the spirit of the German People, to remind them of their 
dignity and their own strength in the face of foreign invasion. The final 
Summa of this thinking is Hegel’s Philosophy of Right.50 With the decay 
of the Holy Roman Empire Hegel transferred to his concept of the Prussian 
state the idea that this state is an Empire (Reich) of the ethical life and of 
Objective Reason, capable of sustaining itself above civil-bourgeois 
society. The latter taken alone would lead to the functionalism of legal 
normativism which has to make its rules respected through force. The 
Hegelian state is not a positivist, decisionist, or dictatorial entity, but the 
Order of Orders, the Institution of Institutions.51 There is an important 
development of this ‘Hegelianism’ which is supposed to explain how 
National Socialism makes up the defects of the Hegelian state which has 
lost its way with the abdication of the Monarchy and the subsequent lack 
of direction of the Prussian Army and the State bureaucracy.52 Here it is 
 
46. C. Schmitt, Les trois types de pensée juridique, at 69 (1995). 
47. Id., at 74–75. 
48. Id., at 93–94. 
49. Id., at 95. 
50. Id., at 97. 
51. Id., at 97–98. 
52. Id., 101–102, 112. See also C. Schmitt, Staat, Bewegung, Volk, Die Dreigliederung der 
politischen Einheit (State, Movement, People: The Three elements of Political Unity) (1933). 
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enough to stress that for Schmitt Law arises from the concrete reality of 
the conditions of life, which means, for this rather abstract language, the 
state community, the social community and, above all, the völkische 
community.53 
Quite simply, Konkretesordnungsdenken will mean for Schmitt a 
defensive German resistance to perceived, above all, cultural imperialism 
from the Anglo-American world. So he begins a new section of the study 
with such rhetoric as “[u]niversalist, all-embracing global and general 
concepts are in international law the typical weapons of interventionism.”54 
Indeed Schmitt also attributes a British tendency to universalist juridical 
thinking to the dispersed nature of British territories and the absence of 
any definite central location. Hence British arguments for the security of 
communications would have a universal quality, i.e. not geographically 
located. At this point Schmitt recalls his basic thesis in Nationalsozialismus 
und Völkerrecht, that international law is a law of treaty reservations and 
that, rather than construct a special legal theory for the seaways, Britain 
makes reservations. For example, the 1922 Treaty with Egypt allowed 
reservations to secure, inter alia, the rights of minorities and the security 
of passage. The Suez Canal is presented as a universal means of communication 
whereas, of course, Britain is representing its own interest in 
universal terms. 
The approach of Britain to the Kellogg-Briand Pact is similar. As with 
the Monroe Doctrine, it is stated that certain territories of the world are 
of vital (lebenswichtige) interest for Britain, that any interference in these 
territories will not be tolerated and a reaction will be regarded as an act 
of self-defense.55 In this way Schmitt demonstrates quite clearly how legal 
arguments can always be reduced to expressions of interest determined 
by space, location etc., so that it is only reasonable for each significant 
Power to think through what its own space-determined, self-understanding 
is. This close relationship between geography, state interest, and the 
development of legal thought can be seen in the British and Dutch defense 
of the freedom of the High Seas against Spanish and Portuguese claims 
to monopoly. Schmitt does not dismiss this way of thinking as cant or 
hypocrisy. Epistemologically he sees it as inevitable that legal 
Weltanschauungen are shaped by what are simply personal, existential 
factors, i.e. attaching to individual subjects of a legal order. It is, for 
Schmitt, an example of the unavoidable attribution of a certain international 
law way of thinking to a particular type of political existence. The 
alternatives for international society are echte Grossraumprinzipien with 
a rule of non-intervention or a false Grossraumprinzip with a consequently 
limitless practice of intervention.56 
 
53. Schmitt (Pensée juridique), supra note 46, at 110–111. 
54. Schmitt (Völkerrechtliche Grossraumordnung), supra note 36, at 43. 
55. Id., at 44–48. 
56. Id., at 52–54. 
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Returning to the theme that the international stage is dominated by the 
struggle of individual Powers to impose their own internal political 
constitutions on others, Schmitt opposes the liberal-democratic concept 
of the defense of minorities to the concept of the Volk and Volksgruppe. 
The contribution of German legal thinking has been to oppose a doctrine 
of minority rights, which is confined to the protection of the individual 
against discrimination because he is a member of a group. Instead, one 
has to recognize there is no particular concept of minority but merely 
“different types of living communities […].”57 For liberal democratic states 
there can be no place for protection of minorities because all individual 
rights can be guaranteed by the freedoms and rights of a constitutional 
state. This is a structural link between national constitution and international 
legal hegemony, in reality a drive to globally enforced homogeneity. 
58 
To resist this in a European Ostraum (eastern space) requires the recognition 
of a different concept of People. Germany has developed such a 
concept. Here, Schmitt places himself firmly within the strains of German 
thought which insist upon the priority of group over individual identity 
and which use the language of race. In particular he relies upon the work 
of one of the foremost National Socialist theorists, Walz.59 This leads him 
to assign to Germany a special role in resisting the ideological hegemony 
of liberal democracy, as enshrined in the minority rights system of the 
Versailles Treaty. There has to be a defense of the ‘volkshaften Eigenart 
jeder Volksgruppe’ (national particularity of each ethnic group) against 
western assimilation, and it has to be by Germany, the particular state 
power whose People are present in this Space, the German Reich. Adolph 
Hitler stated the principle in a speech to the Reichstag on 20 February 
1938, as a right of protection of Germans in other countries. This itself is 
part of the basic principle of mutual respect of each ‘Volkstum,’ which 
underlies the German-Polish declaration of 5 November 1937, itself 
denying any attempt to assimilate and absorb different Volksgruppen.60 
Words such as particularity and type refer to race. It is this racial concept 
of the Volk that Schmitt calls the political idea which should inform the 
new Grossraum of the Middle and East European Space, where there is a 
respect for different Peoples, apart from the Jews. There is a space in which 
Peoples which are not of a different kind live, i.e. except for the Jews who, 
supposedly, are different. It is not a matter of a German Monroe Doctrine, 
but a development of a similar thinking to the early stages of the Monroe 
Doctrine, adding to it the special right to protect German minorities.61 In 
 
57. Id., at 59. 
58. Id., at 60. 
59. Id., citing G.A. Walz, Artgleichheit gegen Gleichartigkeit. Die Beiden Grundprobleme des 
Rechts (Similarity of Type Against Equality of Type: The Two Basic Problems of Law) 
(1938). 
60. Schmitt (Völkerrechtliche Grossraumordnung), supra note 36, at 63–64. 
61. Id., at 64–65. 
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the context of this section of the text, Schmitt’s argument reads as a 
determination to place Germany, in relation to Eastern Europe, in the place 
in which Clemenceau had hoped France would enjoy under the Treaty 
System generally, and under the Minority Treaty System.62 Schmitt sees 
the development of the concept of Grossraum in terms of imperial rivalries 
in which Germany has more understanding of the nature of 
Volksgruppen in eastern Europe and can, on the basis of mutual respect 
of these groups, ensure the exclusion of Western liberal-democratic 
Powers, whose individualist state-constitutions mean they cannot understand 
this area of Europe, but which will, nonetheless, endeavor to impose 
their Weltanschauung as far as possible. 
In this work, as generally with Schmitt, there is little attention paid to 
the Soviet side of the triad relative to the importance it had for Hitler and 
the Nazi Regime.63 Yet for him the boundaries of the Grossraum are clearly 
set in terms of Weltanschauung. On the one side there is the drive to 
assimilation with the goal of the melting pot and, on the other, there is 
the universalism of bolshevist-world revolution coming from the East. 
Against these forces, in a sharpest opposition, the German Reich has to 
defend in the middle of Europe between the two, the sacredness of a 
non-universal Living order that respects the differences of peoples.64 
The conclusion of Schmitt’s argument covers rather too much ground 
too quickly. He refers to a widely held German and National Socialist view 
that the so-called international legal order of states, at least in Europe, 
depended upon a divided Germany and Italy.65 This was reaffirmed with 
Versailles. The renewed strength of the German Reich transforms this situation. 
This Reich is imbued with a so-called ‘substanzhafter Volksbegriff.’ 
However, it would not be enough, as theoreticians such as Guerke propose, 
to replace an inter-state system with an inter-people system of international 
law. This would not be enough to resist universalist forces in world 
society. For this there is needed the concept of a Grossraum defended by 
a Reich. The concept of Reich is not developed enough in the text. 
However, Schmitt does stress that a Volk alone, without a state organization, 
will not have the organization and discipline necessary.66 As he sees 
the threat coming from the West, what is to be defended is still the idea 
of the Volk. Schmitt professes to have no doubt that the intention is already 
forming in the West to undertaken a so-called ‘just war’ against Germany. 
 
62. Id., at 61 and 63. 
63. See again Giese & Menzel (Völkerrechtsdenken der Gegenwart), supra note 4, at 114–143. 
64. Id., at 71. 
65. This was a fundamental feature of Nazi geopolitical-historical thinking about international 
law. See G.A. Walz, Völkerrechtsordnung und Nationalsozialismus, at 8 (1942). 
66. Schmitt (Staat, Bewegung, Volk), supra note 52, at 32. None of this is to suggest that 
Schmitt distances himself from the Volk, as given shape by the Leader, in favour of a fascist 
Italian style state. The conditions for the latter did not exist any longer in Germany, hence 
the need for the Nazi Party etc. 
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This is even being prepared in the academic literature.67 Therefore the 
extent of the threat means that the Volk alone is not enough to withstand 
it. 
This does not mean that the object of the Grossraum ceases to be the 
Volk, but simply that much more is needed to compete with another 
Grossraum, which has expansionist, supposedly universalist aims. What 
Schmitt says is sparse. The Grossraum has to be defended by a Reich. 
The idea of a Reich as an international law concept requires a Volk that 
has shown itself to be up to the task, and to be motivated by particular 
ideas and principles attaching to a Weltanschauung.68 The task of leadership 
falls to a specific Volk. It is difficult to see how Schmitt is anything 
but a ‘main-stream’ Nazi when he says that “[t]he act of the Führer confers 
political reality, historical truth and a great international law future to our 
Reich.”69 The context of the so-called political Idea is once again a mutual 
respect of peoples in the full-blooded National Socialist sense of these 
words: “the respect for each People as a living reality determined by type 
and origin, blood and earth.”70 Whatever may be noted later about 
supposed differences between statist and völkische approaches to 
Grossraumordnung,71 it appears quite clear that Schmitt’s acceptance of 
National Socialist racial ideology, in its most general form with respect 
to the principle of the self-determination of peoples, was wholehearted. 
The Grossraumordnung went through four editions between 1939 and 
1941, the last appearing very shortly after the Nazi attack on the Soviet 
Union. The relationship between Schmitt’s theories and Hitler’s actual 
foreign policy will be explored in the second section of this study. At this 
stage, however, the intention is to follow the internal consistency of 
Schmitt’s theories in the light of his reactions to events. This is essential 
to an understanding of the intellectual integrity of his work, which is not 
the same thing as the question whether Schmitt somehow hoped by his 
writings to ingratiate himself with the National Socialist regime.72 
 
67. Id., esp. at 80–81. See also the key study of C. Schmitt, Die Wendung zum diskriminierenden 
Kriegsbegriff (1988), to be discussed in Section 2.4, infra. 
68. Schmitt (Staat, Bewegung, Volk), supra note 52, at 86. 
69 Id. 
70. Id., at 88. 
71. A basic thesis of Schmoekel’s Grossraumtheorie is that Schmitt somehow ascribed to the 
former theory, for which he was criticised by more orthodox National Socialism theorists. 
See Schmoekel, supra note 7. 
72. A methodological point which Schmoeckel also stresses is that the detail of Schmitt’s work 
is too complex to allow a clear evaluation of the person at every stage. He deplores the 
general tendency to a biographical approach on the ground that it merely serves to strengthen 
already hardened positions of opposed camps in relation to Schmitt; see Schmoekel, supra 
note 7, at 17. While this comment may be true of contemporary German scholarship, it has 
to be asked, as a matter of the history both of ideas and of mentalities, how Schmitt came 
to hold an essentially racist, international law Weltanschauung, and to what extent he 
understood and accepted responsibility for how substantially similar views led to particular 
consequences. Schmoeckel’s position is accepted here only to the extent that the 
presentation of Schmitt’s opinions is treated firstly in purely analytical terms. 
 
[end of page 42] 
 
It has to be said that, at least until 1941, it is quite clear that Schmitt 
regarded the evolution of Germany’s foreign and military policy as perfectly 
compatible with his theory and, presumably, an implementation of 
it. So he refers to a German-Russian Frontier and Friendship Treaty of 
28 September 1939 as setting the boundaries of the both Reichs’ interest 
in the territory of the former Polish state.73 This is a clear reference to the 
outer boundary of the German Grossraum as being that of the beginning 
of the Soviet or Russian Grossraum. He regards the German-Russian treaty 
as a clear exposition of how two Grossräume apply the principle of nonintervention. 
Article 2 of the Treaty expressly rejects the possible of the 
intervention of any third power in the Agreement. The Introduction to the 
Treaty stresses that the Peoples (Völkerschaften) living in these regions 
should have their integrity protected in “ihrer völkischen Eigenart” (their 
national particularity) This is to mean the destruction of the Versailles 
system of so-called minority treaties for this region. For the Baltic Region 
and Romania, treaties for the resettlement of Germans in the Reich have 
been concluded in the course of 1939–40. Equally important, the German- 
Italian Arbitration of 30 August 1940 had assured a correct reshaping 
of the Hungarian-Romanian border from the standpoint of a just 
Volksordnung. At the same time agreements have been made with the 
Hungarian, Bulgarian, and Romanian governments for the protection of 
German minorities, which deliberately fly in the face of the liberal-democratic 
Versailles minority rights system. The latter is firmly rejected. 
Schmitt concludes that all of this practice confirms74 the basic principle 
of non-intervention of Powers foreign to the Region as a valid principle 
of international law concerning minority group rights. 
The question that has to be asked is by what sleight of hand does 
Schmitt dispose of the fate of Poland. How does Schmitt explain the 
German aggression against Poland and its subsequent terrorization? The 
answer is that Schmitt passes this over. After the war, in August 1945, 
Schmitt produced a legal opinion on behalf of Friedrich Frick, who 
expected to be brought before the Nuremberg Tribunal as a major war 
criminal. In this opinion there is mention not of the attack upon Poland 
but of the legal situation in the summer of 1939. The question whether 
the concept of an attack (Angriffskrieg) would be regarded as illegal was 
answered effectively in the negative by all states. The governments of all 
countries not involved in the conflict declared their neutrality and passed 
neutrality laws. This was a classical international law reaction that meant 
that the traditional view of the place of war in international law was 
maintained, i.e. no distinction could be made between a just and an unjust 
 
73. C. Schmitt, Völkerrechtliche Grossraumordung (1941), reproduced in Maschke (Schmitt: 
Staat, Grossraum, Nomos), supra note 13, at 295. 
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war.75 It can surely be extrapolated from this opinion, when taken together 
with Schmitt’s interpretation of the German-Soviet/Russian treaties that 
Schmitt interpreted the prohibition of intervention of so-called outside 
powers (Reiche) as extending to what he regarded, at the time, as the still 
normal operations of international law. These had to include the right of 
a state to go to war. If the German Reich regarded the ultimate recourse 
to the use of force as necessary for the maintenance or development of 
what he calls a ‘Gerechte Volksordnung’ (a just order of peoples) then an 
outside power has no status to object. Schmitt does not say this 
explicitly, but it is reasonable to put together his theory of Grossraum with 
his general theory with respect to war, which will be discussed in a later 
section. 
Apart from individual amendments to his text Schmitt adds two full 
sections from 1939 until 1941, in response to criticism from figures in 
the SS.76 In the first new section, Reich und Raum, there is an unmistakably 
radical incorporation of the concept of colonialism into the structure 
of international law, although its implications for the contemporary situation 
in Europe are not spelled out. Continental European international 
lawyers, and particularly Germans, have remained trapped by the thinking 
about territory which is appropriate to small and middle-ranking states, 
i.e. the idea of territory as a self-enclosed space to be defended by a 
state-power (Staatsgewalt). This ignores substantial German and other 
historical research as to the true nature of the European international law 
system. This has rested upon the assumption that European states would 
draw a so-called friendship line beyond Europe where it was agreed that 
unbounded conflict over colonial possessions would not have legal 
repercussions for the European legal relations of states. This development 
was essential for the transformation of states such as France and Britain 
into Reiche.77 Germany was excluded from this colonial enterprise in 1919 
and this had to mean the defamation and disqualification of Germany as 
a European Power.78 
Schmitt gives only the slightest hint of what the political consequences 
of this analysis must be against the background of 1941 in Europe. The 
whole of European history is marked by the experience that states within 
the European system are allowed to expand with a kind of free hand in 
an area not taken to be part of the international legal community, for 
instance Austria in the Ottoman Balkans. This is the basis for Portugal, 
Spain, England, France, and Holland being Reiche and not simply states. 
For Russia there was the expansion against the Ottomans and in Central 
 
75. C. Schmitt, Das internationalrechtliche Verbrechen des Angriffskrieges und der Grundsatz 
“Nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege” (The international crime of a war of attack etc.), 
edited with notes and Afterword by H. Quaritsch, at 73–74 (1994). 
76. A. Könen, Der Fall Carl Schmitt, at 796 (1995); see also Section 3.4, infra. 
77. Schmitt (Völkerrechtliche Grossraumordung), supra note 73, at 312. 
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Asia. Prussia was the only Great Power which was only a state and which 
could only expand at the expense of other states which already belonged 
to the European international law community. Hence it was easy for Prussia 
to acquire the reputation of a disturber of the peace and as a brutal power-oriented 
state (brutaler Machtstaat), even although the space it occupied 
was small in comparison with other Reiche. Schmitt says that “[i]n unseren 
Tagen, 1940, beginnt eine neue Raum- und Völkerordnung sich abzuheben 
[…].”79 
The League of Nations System has to be seen in this wider Raum-oriented 
context. The intention of the British and French Reiche was, 
through the Versailles status quo, to maintain their imperial division of the 
world. They showed through Italy’s Abyssinia experience and the policy 
of non-intervention in the Spanish Civil War, that they were not able to 
maintain their system of international law, and most importantly, they were 
not able to construct new ‘friendship lines,’ i.e. zones outside the regime 
of European international law through which the growing Peoples 
(wachsende Völker) of Europe could be given a place for just ‘peaceful 
change.’ They pay for their failure not merely with the collapse of their 
status as world powers, but also with the collapse of an international law 
system which rested on them as leading Reiche, and which also rested on 
the spatial division of the Earth (Raumverteilung der Erde) which they had 
conceived.80 
The next new section Der Raumbegriff in der Rechtswissenschaft 
appears much more theoretical than the first, with only hints of a political 
direction. Yet these hints appear unmistakable. Schmitt returns directly 
to his theme of konkrete Ordnung. A classical (17th century) theory of 
mathematical and natural-scientific knowledge favored the idea of state 
territory as an empty space, or as an object over which power was exercised. 
This resembled Kant’s theory of knowledge, that the territory might 
be something whose shape was conferred on it by the perception of the 
state as the observing, acting subject.81 For the concrete approach to space, 
new biological thinking is more helpful. ‘Movement’ does not occur in a 
space. Rather the movement creates the space. From a biological 
perspective the world is not somehow in a space. Rather the space is in 
the world. Space is a product of happenings (Ereignisse) and comes out 
of the objects which are within it, instead of being merely a static location 
in which objects find themselves. So a first conclusion is ‘Der Raum wird 
zum Leistungsraum’ (the space becomes a space of performance).82 Schmitt 
is basing himself on the work of the Heidelberger biologist, Victor von 
Weizaecker. 
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He concludes that such thinking is appropriate for his theory of concrete 
Order. Space as such is not a concrete Order. However, every concrete 
Order and Community must have a place and space which is specific to 
it. Here Schmitt returns to the Germanic idea of law developed since the 
Middle Ages. Land, according to Otto Brunner, writing in 1939, means 
the legal association of land-building and land-commanding people in their 
spatially concrete peaceful order (in ihrer auch räumlich konkreten 
Friedensordnung).83 However, Schmitt recognizes, at another point, that 
the “world is in a state of transition.” He refers to “das grosse weltpolitische 
Geschehen der Gegenwart” (the great world-political events of the 
present) and notes difficulties of terminology have to do with our being 
in an in-between stage. As soon as the Earth has found for itself a secure 
and just division of Grossräume and these are established internally and 
externally, it will be possible to find more satisfactory ways of describing 
the new situation.84 
Such extraordinarily measured remarks that Schmitt adds to his work 
since 1939 change its character radically. In the first text, Reich und Raum, 
it is possible to see no more than an insistence that Germany will watch 
over the development of the principle of ethnic self-determination of 
peoples in eastern and south eastern Europe. This need involve no violation 
of the very existence of any state as sovereign. Only the Jews are 
regarded as artfremd and they do not have a state. There may be coercion 
towards a country that resists the German view of the nature of minorities, 
but there are no clear implications for Germany as a Reich. However, 
Schmitt develops this position decisively. A state becomes a Reich because 
other Reiche accept the idea of a ‘peace-line’ beyond which the state is 
free, without fear of intervention of other states, to expand in territory 
not regarded as part of the European international law community. The 
rules of European international law are suspended to allow the construction 
of colonial empires. These latter are the essential element that 
transforms a European state into a Reich, or world power – something 
that all major states aspire to, usually successfully. Where the attempt is 
made by major European Reiche to exclude one state from this process of 
transformation from state to Reich, it is only to be expected that the 
outcome will be an explosion of the whole system of international law. 
In the second text (Der Raumbegriff in der Rechtswissenschaft), Schmitt 
considers again the element of territory in the traditional definition of the 
state. The international legal order likes to present itself as resting upon 
the concept of territory as an empty space occupied by a static state power. 
However, communities shape law and space therefore receives its significance 
from active, performing communities. Their ‘movement’ has to take 
place, to be somewhere, and it is their activity that gives this ‘somewhere’ 
order. Unless this dynamic is recognized and integrated into the concrete 
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legal order, it is inevitable that those who have already given lines of 
division to the world’s space will find these lines sprung from the outside 
by a Reich which has been forcibly excluded from an active part in the 
shaping of the world’s space. 
It will be necessary to return to these implications which Schmitt implies 
for the integrity of international law because of its ambiguous perspective 
towards the non-Western world. They are expounded in the course of 
and at the end of World War II. However, at this stage, approaching his 
views chronologically it is intended to turn to his development of ideas 
concerning the concept of war and international law. This brings one back 
in time to the years before the war, where Schmitt’s theories of space had 
not yet been fully developed. 
His concept of war, however, evolves into a changing concept of the 
nature of war at sea and the nature of total war. The same evolution is 
affected by his concept of Law as Nomos and becomes a fuller critique of 
international law. The central point of the critique is that the Earth lacks 
a Nomos. Schmitt attempts to argue that the failure to resolve the place of 
Germany as a Reich does not allow Europeans to escape the fact that their 
theory of imperialism undermines the integrity of their universalist concept 
of international law and leaves world society without any legal shape. 
 
 
2.4. The turn to a discriminating concept of war, and total war on land and sea 
 
Schmitt is concerned that the determination of the Western powers to 
maintain the status quo created by the Versailler Diktat will lead them to 
undermine the whole conceptual framework of international law. He has 
already characterized World War I as a determination of the West to impose 
its view of society upon the Central Powers. Now he takes up a major 
theme of his original study on Nationalsozialismus und Völkerrecht, the 
liberal, formalist reduction of international law to a sanction procedure 
that reduces the concept of war to that of a peace-enforcement action. 
Schmitt develops immediately the theme that built into the liberal approach 
to international law is the desire to turn the violence of inter-state war 
into that of an international civil war.85 The liberal concept of legalization 
of relations does now require that if one is to speak of a just war in 
a relativist and agnostic age, one cannot return to the world of scholastic 
philosophy or of Grotius. The League of Nations is a ‘Legalisierungssystem’ 
(legalization), which has to claim a monopoly of decision over 
whether a war is just, and what remedies may be applied. However, in 
the face of the crisis of the late 1930s, the question arises how to ensure 
a ‘Positivisierung’ (positivisation) of the League Order so that it becomes 
a real constitution with the procedures for effective collective action. Here 
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Schmitt is conscious that scholarship is now concerned to go beyond the 
apparently purely logical constructions of a constitution of the international 
community which were current in the 1920s, in particular in 
the work of Verdross, Die Verfassung der Völkerrechtsgemeinschaft 
(Constitution of the international law community) from 1926.86 
This drive to go beyond Austrian-style logical normativism to 
effective institutionalism is, in the work of George Scelle and Hersch 
Lauterpacht, firmly based in a liberal-democratic Weltanschauung. One 
is arguing not simply for a logical primacy of international law, but for a 
primacy of a legal order above states which is radically individualistic and 
democratic. George Scelle moves, in the French Legalist tradition, in the 
direction of an international legislative order.87 In turn, Hersch Lauterpacht 
also dethrones the state in favor of a civitas maxima, with a universal 
common law and an international judiciary at the center.88 Despite the 
difference in emphasis and style between the French and the English, they 
both aim for a universalized and institutionalized World Legal Order, in 
particular a liberal-democratic international law.89 
This can be seen clearly in the work of Scelle. For him the state is a 
fiction, as the only legal subject is the human individual. The state is transformed 
from anthropomorphism or ancient metaphysics into a collection 
of governing persons who owe their competence to delegation by international 
norms. Institutions which till now regarded themselves as purely 
national find that they depend entirely upon an international order which 
constitutes the last instance, ‘Kompetenz-Kompetenz.’ This draws very 
heavily upon Kelsen’s normative system, but now Scelle goes beyond 
him in giving the norm a dynamic sufficient to create an institution. He 
moves beyond Triepel’s notion that the different state wills can reach a 
general agreement to the idea of particular individuals being granted 
competence to create international legislative acts. There is no question 
of looking to the problem of the binding nature of treaties. Instead, the 
question is simply which individuals are given the competence to issue 
legislation. This is simply the transfer onto the international level of the 
legislative model of the 19th century liberal constitutionalism, the sole 
function of which remains the defense of the life, liberty and property of 
the individual.90 
As one has to do with Weltanschauungen one must expect aggressive 
action. Scelle is perfectly aware of the defects of the existing League of 
Nations structure, but it is clear to him that under article 11 of its Statute 
it would be open to the League to intervene in Germany against the 
treatment of the Jews. Interventions in Nationalist Socialist Germany, 
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bolshevist Russia, and fascist Italy would all be justified and fail to be 
undertaken only for political reasons. The individual has a legal right to 
resist any act of his state that is contrary to international law. This marks, 
in Schmitt’s view, the transformation of inter-state wars to civil wars.91 
There is a polar link between liberal individualism and international law 
universalism, which give as a final goal an internationalized federal world 
order. Dictatorships and non-liberal states shadow such a historical development. 
War, as a legal concept, becomes impossible. There is either law 
and no war or there is war and illegality (Unrecht), i.e. as an illegal attack 
(Angriffskrieg), a crime.92 
Schmitt considers that the developments in question have to be seen 
in epochal terms. Already during the World War the intention of liberal 
propaganda was to turn the war into an ‘executing action’ against the 
criminality of the German government, albeit not strictly against the 
German people. However, the German people as a whole were able to 
resist this perspective, which leaves us with the traditional concept of war, 
as not illegal but outside the law.93 Here it is extremely important to hold 
the new institutional approach to international law to the letter. It is not 
enough to take goals as having been reached, as one might read out of 
the works of Scelle, Lauterpacht, Fischer Williams, and McNair. One 
cannot simply talk about just or unjust war. So the Kellogg-Briand Pact 
is not enough on its own to put the classical legal concept of war aside. 
There has to be a binding monopoly of decision-making actually already 
standing above states and clearly able to enforce itself against non-party 
states.94 To pretend that one is almost there in terms of institutionalization 
is extremely dangerous, because it ignores the capacity of numerous 
states to resist effectively the implementation of this vision as German 
resistance in the World War showed. Underlying this belief in a supposedly 
last step forward is a vision of universalism to be reached by means 
of a world federal state. Yet, stresses Schmitt, this is precisely the issue 
in dispute.95 
So any future conflict around such an issue of Weltanschauung will be 
all the more ferocious. For those states that think they represent a World 
Federal State in the making, the enemy state will now be a bandit, 
gangster-state, without any worth or honor. This is a turning of interna- 
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tional war to civil war, but without the actual dismantling of state-organized 
peoples. Yet the effective treatment of war now as civil war must 
only intensify the concept of enemy which is in play. There is a total 
definition of the enemy who has now been reduced to the status of a robber 
and pirate.96 German international law doctrine has perceived since the 
middle of the 1930s the danger of total war that underlies pacifist 
universalism. This is a world picture (Weltbild) which is opposed to the 
German concept of a political-pluralist view of world society. The universalist 
ideology must lead to a concept of Vernichtungskrieg (war of 
annihilation) which has as its object the springing apart of the enemy state, 
the destruction of its government, in the style of civil war conflict. An 
executing action against a rebel or, in terms of civilization, backward 
country – these are all ideas present in the Allied thinking in their war 
against Germany in 1914–1918.97 
Schmitt concludes that the only outcome of the very confused French 
and English thinking will be to leave the international community without 
any coherent framework of the place of war in international law and, hence, 
without any framework of law in international society. The crucial 
mistaken assumption upon which all of these authors work is that it is 
possible to go from an unclear and unrealistic view of the League of 
Nations to the concept of a universal world order.98 Clearly for Schmitt 
there appears to run through his text the expectation that the conflicting 
perspectives will lead to a repetition of history and that Germany will once 
again be treated as criminal. He sees this as a logical outcome of the 
Weltanschauung that is determined to treat war as a denationalized form 
of international sanction. Those who represent this view must come up 
against states that oppose it, i.e. dictatorships, whether fascist, nazi, or 
bolshevist. To persist in their view they (those who are liberal pacifists) 
have to wage a total war, not a limited war among combatant armies. This 
total war must serve a civil war style function to separate the people of 
these robber, pirate states from their governments. Such total war has to 
lead to a reconstitution of the existing state order but, as said already, with 
the ferocity of a long drawn out international civil war, in which the final 
result could be generations away.99 
The fundamental dividing point is so intense because, underlying the 
denationalizing of war, there is a whole liberal-democratic perspective, 
Weltanschauung, which is opposing itself to what it regards as an 
outmoded, metaphysical view of the state, to collectivist concepts of 
Volksgruppen identity, as well as to bolshevist forms of social-economic 
organization. None of this is to say that this Weltanschauung has immediate 
aggressive intentions. However, it is irreconcilably opposed to 
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anything but its own universalist program. Furthermore, it clearly intends, 
as a matter of urgency, to put its own program into place on the international 
scene. It regards opposition to its program as rooted in the internal 
ideological constitution of other states. Unless it gives up its project, 
immediately a matter of transforming the League of Nations, global 
conflict is inevitable. Schmitt does not draw explicitly these conclusions. 
Yet he appears to expect history to repeat itself. 
With respect to the development of ius in bello, Schmitt’s preoccupation 
is primarily with England and the United States, powers which he puts 
together as Anglo-American and sometimes, Anglo-Saxon. France disappears 
as an ideological opponent. Indeed, Schmitt is even praiseworthy 
of the French representation of what he considers the continental perspective 
to war. It has its origins in the construction of the French state 
that was the first example of a territorially enclosed state dedicated to 
limited territorial wars engaging only official state combatants.100 Louis 
XIV completed France’s adherence to this style of warfare with the dismissal 
of Colbert in 1672, marking France as a land rather than a sea 
power.101 
What is crucial here is that Schmitt moves into the treatment of the ius 
in bello in terms of his theory about the influence of space upon the law. 
In the first instance he is not original and follows a well understood continental 
complaint about the impact of sea power on England’s concept of 
warfare. Many German international lawyers carefully developed this 
complaint in the years immediately preceding World War II. Schmitt 
distances himself from such an approach and complains that it fails to 
appreciate that the perspective of the land-based, and virtually land-locked 
state was not appropriate for a Germany aiming to break out of these 
confines to reach the status of a Reich with its own Grossraum.102 For 
this purpose it was necessary to come to terms with the full implications 
of the Anglo-American concepts of space-determined warfare. 
Consistent with his theory that Law is a matter of the perception, 
Weltanschauung, of the subject, virtually a personal matter, Schmitt 
develops the English approach to war at sea. It is traditionally a function 
of an ideology apparently quite primitive in its early stages, but providing 
quite clear roots for the present ideology of Anglo-Americanism. The 
argument is immensely complex and not necessarily logical in all its stages, 
but then the responsibility for that rests not with Schmitt but with Anglo- 
American legal culture. 
The starting point is the construction of the English Empire from the 
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time of Queen Elisabeth until the Treaty of Utrecht. During this time the 
English undertook a plunder of the Spanish and Portuguese Empires primarily 
through the activities of privateers acting upon their own initiative. 
War at sea was condoned by royal authority but was not a 
state-sponsored or controlled activity. The Crown benefited very substantially 
and honored its privateers, but this essentially economic warfare 
did not implicate the construction of an English state. Instead, this activity 
built up English strength on the basis that the seas were a space in which 
there should be the fullest private economic activity unhindered by state 
regulation. The function of English official power becomes that of ensuring 
that no other so-called state power obstructs the full expansion of any 
private, even if effectively English maritime trade.103 
This analysis brings Schmitt back to what he regards as the English 
version of Grossraum for the country conceived of as a Reich. It is not 
enough that English naval power will remain in the background to ensure 
that no other state attempts to monopolize the sea and restrain English 
commerce. This was merely the first stage of resistance to Spanish and 
Portuguese pretensions. Indeed, in the 17th century England also displayed 
monopolist pretensions to appropriate the sea. However, English maritime 
technical genius moved it in a different direction. It proved supreme, not 
in the occupation of the sea, as if it were land, but in the mastery, through 
superior shipmanship, navigation, and naval warfare, in the negotiation 
of elements which were not to be mastered in the sense of occupied, but 
merely ridden and directed in the sense of natural elements.104 Such power 
provided a basis for an English insistence upon the acquisition of supporting 
points, naval bases, strategic territories etc., all of which came to 
make up a colonial Empire, stretching across the Earth (always a capital 
for Schmitt).105 
However, even this does not alter the original character of England’s 
proposal for the world. The freedom of the seas is universal. It covers the 
South China Sea as much as the Baltic. It affects the entire character of 
the Mediterranean.106 It is the foundation for an ideology that dictates that 
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the international legal order is about the facilitation of a liberal world 
economy untrammeled by considerations of State and Volk. The language 
of liberty means liberty of trade, but accompanying it are other individual 
rights to property, opinion, and movement. No state can claim any right 
to resist this ideology. No space in the world is immune to its penetration. 
107 In the late 19th century Germany began to resist this ideology. 
The language of dualism in law developed by Triepel is intended to provide 
a wall of state resistance. The primacy of state law over international law 
is the first stage in the struggle of particular states to provide resistance.108 
Yet, the struggle for world economic power could not be conducted from 
within the confines of the territories of European states. 
The question of Grossraum is originally economic. It concerns whether 
there can be devised a larger form of economic space which can provide 
an alternative to the world economic space of the English109 and, increasingly, 
by the turn of the century, the Americans. For Schmitt, America is 
a maritime power and natural associate of England not because of 
similarities of language and history, but rather because America is not 
threatened by any neighbor along its land frontiers.110 These two powers 
agree upon a concept of world space which is liberal, economic and, at 
the same time, universal. In principle, there is no part of the world that is 
immune. The Anglo-Americans do not occupy the seas. Instead, they 
ensure that the seas are the way to a total opening of the world. 
It is now, writing in 1940 to 1942, crucial for Schmitt to understand 
how the Anglo-Americans treat maritime space in the event of conflict. It 
is already established practice that the freedom of the seas, with complete 
freedom of commerce, becomes in the event of war freedom to conduct 
total war against not merely all the private resources of the immediate 
enemy, but also against the private resources of any states which attempt 
to trade with the enemy. Total blockade of the enemy and, hence, total 
economic warfare against the entire population of the enemy is appropriate 
and to be expected. It is not to be expected that Schmitt will object to all 
of this as a peculiarly inhuman Weltanschauung. Humanity is not a matter 
that interests Schmitt. Indeed, Schmitt will object that warfare is all the 
worse for being waged in the name of a humanitarian vision of the freedom 
of the individual. Rather, the totality, even shapelessness, of the Anglo- 
American concept of warfare has to be seen in terms of the absence of a 
developed concept of the state which would view conflict as taking place 
within confined territorial spaces. The continental state tradition of limiting 
such conflicts to state combatant forces would be essential if there was to 
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be anything left to achieve in a final victory in the confined European 
space. For the Anglo-American, warfare was, in the first instance, e.g. in 
struggles against Holland in the 17th century, about the destruction of the 
economic wealth and power of rivals. Later warfare could be given a more 
ideological tone concerning the immediate restoration of an unhindered 
global space for the economic individual. This should, obviously, given 
the function of ideology, be seen as meaning the same thing as it did in 
the 17th century wars. Warfare whose motive is primarily economic will 
seek the destruction of the economic foundations of the opponent, in this 
definite sense, total warfare.111 
Schmitt doubts the ideological efficacy of German international law 
resistance to this legal ideology when it confines itself to objecting that 
the English do not observe the continental concept of warfare, based upon 
the desire of the rather narrowly territorially confined state to preserve 
itself after the conflict, which it has, in any case, voluntarily entered in a 
kind of power-game, war as politics by other means. Offensive wars of 
conquest are not a necessary part of Anglo-American international law 
ideology, except in the very broadly defensive and incidental sense of 
keeping world trading routes open. So, the ideological opposition from the 
continent has to be in terms of an understanding of the universalist nature 
of the ever expanding Anglo-American Grossraum. Some way has to be 
found to persuade it to withdraw into limits that allow a place for other 
Grossräume.112 
Schmitt does not develop a full, alternative concept of ius in bello. 
However, he does offer two points for consideration. First, Anglo- 
American legal ideology is not neutral or pluralistic over against other 
ideologies. It supposes for itself a supreme moral, humanitarian authority. 
This leads to a virtually schizophrenic attitude to alternative ideologies. 
Its first tendency to respond is isolationist. That is, the alternative is so 
disapproved of that contact is not sought at all. Isolationism is a common 
feature of English and American foreign policy. It is obviously influenced 
by an insular sense of space, but it is much more marked by a sense of 
moral superiority which does not allow itself to be contaminated by 
entanglements – quarrels – which are of an inferior quality, i.e. about 
essentially insignificant territorial disputes, with inferior powers which 
 
111. Schmitt (Land und Meer), supra note 103, at 88, regarding the extent of the conflict as 
waged by a sea-power. See also C. Schmitt, Staatliche Souveränität, reproduced in Maschke 
(Schmitt: Staat, Grossraum, Nomos), supra note 13, at 419 et seq., for a discussion of the 
incapacity of England to approach conflicts in terms of the parameters of the state. 
112. Schmitt (Land und Meer), supra note 103, at 80–85. Schmitt sees Germany as a loser 
both at land and at sea. It was kept out of the great land-seizures (Landnahme) of the New 
World, and was itself the subject of land-seizures within Europe, a play-ground for a 
battle between world-Catholicism and world-Protestantism, in which it could not decide 
its place. The non-Jesuit catholic Germans and the Lutheran, non-Calvinist Germans were 
not able to retain a space for themselves. Indeed Lutheranism’s small-territory orientation 
is contemporaneous with the disappearance of German sea-power, the Hanseatic Baltic Sea 
power. 
 
[end of page 54] 
 
suppose that they can change their status significantly by seizing relatively 
small portions of territory. The difficulty is that when such morally superior 
powers find themselves drawn into conflict they do not regard their 
opponents as moral equals. The very foundation for the classical European 
concept of warfare is absent. It is not a matter of two state powers choosing 
to resolve a relatively minor territorial or status difference by resorting to 
a duel-like ‘armed-combat.’ Instead, it is a matter of destroying, as 
economically as possible, forces which appear to dare to upset the indisputably 
moral world order based upon the full expression of the economic 
freedom of the individual. Hence, such conflicts are not bounded by any 
classical concepts of war limitation at all. The liberal humanitarian 
isolationist restraint turns quickly to the most furious conduct of total war, 
aiming at the complete obliteration of the enemy. If any response to this 
ideology is possible at all it has to be in terms of an alternative concept 
of Grossraum.113 
Second, Schmitt tends in favor of a technological imperative of total 
war. Grossraum is originally an economic concept. It has been developed 
in German literature since the turn of the century around notions such as 
Mitteleuropa and has encouraged Germany to search for its economic 
space. This is thought out in terms of the impact of radical technological 
change on the nature of economic power.114 Schmitt does not look to a 
concept of Lebensraum in territorial terms of land for settlement, at least 
at this point. Anglo-American concepts of Grossraum cannot be opposed 
with a concept that is merely an extension of the traditional continental 
concept of a self-enclosed territorial state. Instead, the German Reich has 
to appeal to the idea that it preserves a space of freedom for Peoples, to 
allow them to develop their particularity in distinctive ways. He cites an 
Irish author (without reference) who says that universalism makes the 
smaller Peoples chickens in the kitchen of the cosmopolitan restaurant.115 
It can also be recognized, more positively, that the traditional Anglo- 
American dominance of the sea, the root of its economy-driven individualist 
ideology, is itself now put in question by technological developments, 
especially in terms of aviation and air warfare. It is now a fact that the 
sea can be the subject of control the same as land.116 
However, apart from resistance to the Anglo-American view that its 
ideological writ may run worldwide across all seas, Schmitt does not offer 
any picture of how the effects of armed conflict might be limited. The 
matter does not appear to concern him. The struggle between Grossräume 
concerns the relative merits of their underlying political ideas. The means 
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to uphold these will include, to put it quite banally, the use of all ‘modern 
technologies.’ At least that is the impression one obtains from his discussion 
of the economic origins of the concept of Grossraum and his belief 
that the distinctiveness of the Anglo-American hold over the seas is 
diminishing.117 However, the goal of the German Reich is not total. It is 
to force the British and Americans to withdraw from global dominance to 
their own spaces, to allow the co-existence of several Grossräume.118 
 
 
2.5. Imperialism and the loss of nomos 
 
Already by 1940 Schmitt had developed a clear conception of what a 
permanent world domination by Anglo-American liberal pacifism would 
mean for the structure of the traditional body of European international 
law.119 By the end of World War II these deliberations were incorporated 
into Der Nomos der Erde, although it was not published until 1950. 
However, the development of Schmitt’s argument, now only remotely 
connected to National Socialism, is still related to the criticism of the 
liberal democratic state. Its imperialist proclivity is rooted in the hollowness 
of a parliamentarianism that is a system of legality without legitimacy. 
This has to be considered briefly before one can understand how it 
is that such a parliamentary state is imperialist. 
Writing about parliamentarianism in the 1920s Schmitt argues that the 
liberal concept of Law is a myth. In a mass society Parliament is dominated 
by powerful interest groups which find their expression in party 
factions. Each attempts to seize upon the ideological or rhetorical force 
of legality but this is nothing more than a dictatorship of an accidental 
majority over a numerical minority.120 Legitimacy is absent in the sense 
that a conviction or sense of obligation from the people could only come 
through some appearance of direct democracy. That pressure will build 
up for direct democracy is inevitable because of the blockage represented 
by party factions and cartel or corporate style interest groups. The latter 
certainly seek to deck themselves in the rhetoric of a liberal legality, but 
the conflict between traditional legality and the desire for democratic 
legitimacy favors the bypassing of parliamentarianism in favor of authoritarian 
and even totalitarian style presidential government, if the legitimacy 
of political society is not to disintegrate entirely.121 Fascism and 
 
117. Id., for Schmitt’s discussion of the law of the air and of the sea in terms of the technical 
capacity of an airforce to dominate the sea. This seems to set a consistent tone for the 
perspective that technological power will be used to the full to ensure the triumph of the 
Weltanschauung of each Reich in its turn. 
118. Id., at 179. See also Schmitt (Die letzte globale Linie), supra note 113, at 447. 
119. C. Schmitt, Die Auflösung der europäischen Ordnung im Völkerrecht (The Decomposition 
of the European Order in International Law) (1940), reproduced in Maschke (Schmitt: 
Staat, Grossraum, Nomos), supra note 13, at 372. 
120. Schmitt (Die geistige Lage des heutigen Parlamentarismus), supra note 38, at 38 et seq. 
121. Schmitt (Legalität und Legitimität), supra note 37, at 312 et seq. 
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bolshevism are attempts to respond to the socio-economic failure of the 
liberal democratic state, itself driven by economic interests in the form of 
cartels, which are not subject to any democratic political restraint. So, 
economic imperialism accompanies parliamentarian democracy and the 
question is how to oppose both. 
Schmitt had already touched upon the forms of economic imperialism 
in 1932. The appearance of unrestricted international economic relations 
concealed a willingness, particularly by the United States, to use above all 
economic coercion to achieve an undisturbed operation of its vision. At 
this time Schmitt had in mind mainly the economic penalties which the 
Versailles Treaty imposed upon Germany and the manner in which 
Germany suffered economic warfare to the point of attempted starvation.122 
By the end of the 1930s Schmitt expands this theory into a systematic 
critique of the destruction of the international law tradition. 
At the international level, the bankruptcy of the liberal myth of Law 
showed itself decisively in the context of late 19th century colonialism, 
in particular with respect to Africa. Between the 16th and 19th centuries 
there was a specifically European international law. It rested upon a precarious 
Ethos, but one with a content. The word State signified the 
renaissance construction, which asserted absolute internal authority so as 
to put an end to murderous religious wars.123 The legal order especially 
focused on the limitation of the effects of conflicts among sovereign 
princes. The laws of war concerned the ideological neutralization of 
political violence in international relations. A part of the latter had to be 
indifference to internal constitutions of states.124 The liberal political 
revolutions, which Schmitt dates from 1848, gradually dissolved the Ethos 
of European international law. The insistence upon a priority for individual 
liberties, attached also to a free market economy, always understood itself 
as a universalizing ideology. The State is merely a framework for maintaining 
the stability of economic relations and the neutrality implied in the 
concept of the state is gone. It is instrumentalised by an expansionist, 
universalizing ideology, which is a cloak for the economic groups that 
capture the principle of legality in parliamentary factions.125 
Until the 19th century the non-European world was a no-man’s land 
which provided occasional theatres for the extension of European dynastic 
conflicts. Economic exploitation was intermittently fierce, but it did not 
have universalist pretensions in what was still a Eurocentric international 
 
122. C. Schmitt, Völkerrechtliche Formen des modernen Imperialismus, in Schmitt (Positionen 
und Begriffe), supra note 11, at 162, where Schmitt begins by trying to undo the 
ideological impact of the argument that one can set the economic against the political. 
See also Ulmen, supra note 1, at 58 et seq.; Maschke (Drei Motive im Anti-Liberalismus), 
supra note 13, at 71. 
123. Schmitt (Nomos der Erde), supra note 1, at 112 et seq. 
124. Id., at 115. 
125. Schmitt (Legalität und Legitimität), supra note 37, at 343. 
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law.126 After the Congress of Berlin the European powers took the fateful 
step of saying that they had to incorporate the rest of the planet, in order 
to guarantee a global application of the rule of legality. They extended 
the concept of territorial sovereignty as they understood it in Europe to 
Africa, so that the territory of the African colonies had to be regarded as 
an integral part of European states.127 Further, Europe proceeded to treat 
the rest of the planet that it did not occupy as part of a global system of 
liberal legality, with the caveat that the remaining states were subjected 
to capitulations that were supposed to guarantee the same conditions of 
legality attaching to territorial sovereignty which European states themselves 
considered necessary.128 The liberal concept of legality covers the 
entire earth through the temporary force of European arms but it does not 
rest on any sense of place in the new continents. Europeans themselves 
now lose any sense of place-located identity. In fact the extension of their 
European order now means, for instance, that the concept of recognition 
of new states, their admission to the European order, becomes a mere 
formality. Recognition came to mean nothing but a statement of confidence 
by other states as to the stability of the newly created situation.129 
The new global international law has become a rootless, i.e. not a place-bound 
system, an arbitrary juxtaposing of factual relations. There were 
fifty or more states, hardly any of which claimed to be exclusively 
European, given their imperialist-universal pretensions. They were completely 
heterogeneous, without common values. At the same time they laid 
claim to the rhetoric of liberal legality, above all, the equality of each state 
before the Law, and the sovereignty of each state which could only be 
bound by what it had agreed with others acting together. The fundamental 
weakness of this system is that states are no longer able to contain the 
possibilities of political violence through the classical doctrine of neutrality. 
This was to have devastating consequences for the civil wars that 
they came to wage among themselves.130 
Furthermore, at the international level the only source of new law that 
this system could offer would be treaties. Yet where any treaties at all 
could be concluded they were filled with so many reservations that, in 
their own terms, they could not even make the formal claim to constitute 
an international legal order. The development of law through general 
custom or precedent could only have an equally confusing effect. What 
sense could it have to transpose as precedents, for example, incidents 
between Belgium and Holland to Siam and Indo-China? The liberal 
tendency to abstraction and generalization would certainly try, but the 
 
126. Schmitt (Nomos der Erde), supra note 1, at 200 et seq. 
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outcome would be senseless for the concrete populations bound to the particular 
territories.131 
 
 
 
3. CARL SCHMITT AS AN ADVISER OF THE NAZI REGIME? 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
The view is widely held in Germany today that Schmitt wished, at the very 
least, to attract the attention and favor of the Nazi Regime with his theory 
of Grossraum. He is thereby taken to have approved of Hitler Germany’s 
expansion policy towards the East. This discredits him professionally, so 
that there is no interest within the discipline of international law for his 
work. It has only a historical interest.132 It is intended to explore this 
problem closely from the perspective that Schmitt’s critique of Anglo- 
American international law ideology continues to have acute actuality. For 
instance, an article in the English quality Sunday newspaper argues, inter 
alia, that 
 
[t]he common enemy of the new political ideas of the Nineties is the voracious 
global market, which brings waves of downsizing and delayering, disruption and 
dislocation. How can a country engage with the global economy, and enjoy all the 
benefits that can bring, and yet retain a sense of social cohesion and civic culture? 
That is now the central question of politics […].133 
 
It is obviously the question that Schmitt has been addressing. No state or 
ethnic group is now able to challenge the ‘depoliticized’ global economic 
structures. The central thesis of this paper, as stated in the Introduction to 
Section I above, is that the spectacular conclusion of Hitler’s Germany 
was the first stage in the establishment of the singular liberal hegemony 
which is supposed to mark the end of history. Hence, it is a central part 
of contemporary debate to attempt not only to unravel the contribution of 
Schmitt to the ideology of the Nazi Regime, but also to pose the question 
whether there is a seamless web running from his ideas to those of the 
Regime. 
This question will be tackled in the wider terms of what it could mean, 
historically, to give international law advice to the Nazi Regime, particularly 
after 1938. Such an inquiry is not only relevant to the assessment of 
the guilt of Schmitt for the aggressive policies of the Regime, but also to 
the appraisal of the compatibility of Nazi Weltanschauung, as practiced by 
 
131. Id., at 212. 
132. Even a historical work such as Schmoeckel’s aroused considerable reservations, as a chosen 
topic, in the Faculty of Law in Munich where it was written. I was a visiting Alexander 
von Humbolt Fellow in Munich at the time the work was completed in 1993. 
133. C. Leadbeater, What is the Big Idea? The Observer (4th August 1996). 
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its leading figures, especially Hitler, with any conceivable view of international 
law. This inquiry will lead into the more ambiguous territory of 
Schmitt’s own relationship with the Regime. It will be taken as clear that 
he very much wished to influence it and to have his views accepted as 
the proper framework for a German Ostpolitik, which he particularly 
wished to justify to Anglo-American opponents. However, when it comes 
to a consideration of the merits of Schmitt’s ideas, in comparison with 
those of the Regime’s practitioners, it will be argued that assessment of 
the extent of his complicity with the Regime remains largely a matter of 
judgement. It depends upon whether one considers that he should not have 
tried to exercise influence upon it. 
The roots of Schmitt’s own Weltanschauung are very similar to Hitler’s, 
in particular his understanding of the nature of the relationship of Law and 
Politics. This raises the question whether Schmitt was realistic, or, alternatively, 
sincere, in appearing to limit the international law outcomes of 
his analysis well behind the limits set by Hitler. Nonetheless, there seems 
to be no doubt that Schmitt and Hitler diverged radically both in the extent 
of their hostility to Anglo-Americanism and in their understanding of 
Germany’s expansionist policy towards the East. This is not simply to be 
read out of the lack of detail in Schmitt’s analysis of the Grossraum idea, 
i.e. its geographical extent and the manner in which it was to be 
administered. While such lack of clarity will be taken as grave, indicating 
also a lack of political seriousness and responsibility, the decisive points 
of divergence with Hitler appear in the definition of the place of war in 
relation to politics and in the issue whether a Grossraum should itself be 
a springboard to global dominance. Schmitt does offer a reasoned, in the 
sense of limited, critique of Anglo-American international law ideology 
that continues to have considerable credibility. To read into his work 
Hitler’s own agenda is to engage in a form of conspiracy theory that 
violates both the ideas and structure of Schmitt’s writing. Schmitt’s aim 
was certainly not diagnostic in the sense of offering a merely contemporary 
historical snapshot of international society. He wished to be an 
adviser. However, he has to be credited with having failed! 
 
3.2. Carl Schmitt’s writings as international law advice 
 
This issue was raised at Nuremberg. It is well known that Schmitt was 
accused of being an adviser to the Nazi Regime and that he denied the 
charge. The most interesting part of his response is his theoretical argument 
that the giving of legal advice to the Regime was to misunderstand the 
manner in which the Regime functioned. While this argument will be taken 
as demonstrably correct historically, it still leaves the question open how 
Schmitt could have thought his own writings compatible with the Regime’s 
general Weltanschauung. 
It is the attention that the Völkerrechtliche Grossraumordnung achieved 
abroad that appears to have marked him as a key adviser to the Regime. 
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The Times and the Daily Mail consider that Schmitt enjoys an official 
position as Hitler’s key advisor, at least as someone who can be regarded 
as a trustworthy guide to a German policy that remains concealed. The 
outcome would be an Eastern Europe under German domination.134 
Schmoeckel considers it obvious that the theory influenced Hitler, who 
made an enthusiastic reference to the Germans adopting their own Monroe 
Doctrine in his April 28th 1939 Reichstag speech in response to President 
Roosevelt’s note to him of April 14th. Hitler spoke of Lebensraum rather 
than Grossraum but in Schmoeockel’s view the formulation and thought 
is clearly taken by Hitler from Schmitt. Strangely, Schmoeckel adds that 
he accepts the view that the borrowing was not direct, that Hitler would 
have picked up the idea from the foreign press and somehow would have 
imagined that the idea was originally his. The reason for this rather 
abstruse interpretation of the influence of Schmitt was the report that he 
received a warning from a member of the Regime that Hitler regarded 
the idea as his own, and that Schmitt had better not be heard to disabuse 
him.135 One can hardly have imagined that Schmitt, wanting to exercise 
influence in Regime circles would have been so indiscreet to have entered 
into open argument on such a point, but it might also be doubted whether 
the member of the Regime was giving a necessary warning. He might have 
known of the example of Ribbentrop. One of the ways in which Ribbentrop 
managed to exercise considerable influence on Hitler 
 
was the gift of storing away in his memory pet ideas of the Führer and then 
introducing them on later occasions as ideas of his own – a procedure which could 
not but persuade Hitler that Ribbentrop was a man of discernment and judgement 
[…].”136 
 
In any event, Schmitt quickly wrote another short paper in which he praises 
the effectiveness of Hitler’s speech without claiming any credit for it.137 
The crucial question for the international lawyer, when faced with this 
meticulous tracing of historical influences, is whether Schmitt can be taken 
to have acquiesced in, or openly approved of the methods which Hitler 
intended to use to achieve his Grossraum, i.e., to be precise, aggressive 
war against Poland, and, later, the Soviet Union. At Nuremberg in 1947, 
Schmitt was interrogated primarily on the strength of his participation in 
 
134. Maschke (Schmitt: Staat, Grossraum, Nomos), supra note 13, at 347, for comments of the 
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Schmitt’s article Grossraum gegen Universalismus: Der völkerrechtliche Kampf um die 
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the debate on Grossraumordnung.138 Schmitt had clearly stated in his 
rejoinder to Hitler’s speech that the purpose of a German adoption of 
the Monroe doctrine was to ensure a ‘living together’ of peoples 
(Zusammenleben) in spite of the pressure of a universalist ideology.139 
Bendersky is impatient with the idea that Schmitt could be taken to have 
advocated war or conquest, or even to have fostered the foreign policy 
aims of Nazi ideology.140 The first part of this statement may be true, in 
the absence of evidence to the contrary. However, Schmitt continued to 
regard the waging of war (Angriffskrieg) as still allowed under international 
law, at least in 1939, and indeed as part of the structure of any 
viable system of such law.141 The second part of Bendersky’s statement 
goes too far. All of Schmitt’s writings after 1939 are based upon an 
enthusiastic anticipation of the outcome of German attempts to break out 
of its ‘Kleinstaatlichkeit’ (status as a small state) and achieve a definitive 
Grossraum no longer contested by the Anglo-American world. The 
essential part of this debate, in Schmitt’s view, did not have to be whether 
the Grossraum was based upon racial foundations, but whether its principle 
would be conceded by Germany’s most serious protagonists, Britain 
and America. In trying to take issue with these two countries Schmitt was 
hardly showing Hitler’s anglophilia. Hitler’s most passionate objective was 
to persuade Britain and America not to frustrate or stand in the way of 
his drive to the East.142 The most that Schmitt’s writing could have done 
would have been to persuade a few intellectuals that these countries were 
in fact Germany’s bitterest opponents.143 So it is likely that Schmitt is fair 
in claiming, as he does, that “what is decisive is the distinction between 
the intention to promote scholarly research and knowledge and that to 
 
138. J.W. Bendersky, Carl Schmitt at Nuremberg, 72 Telos 91 (1987), at 97, including a 
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139. Schmitt (Positionen und Begriffe), supra note 11, at 302. 
140. Bendersky, supra note 138, at 93. 
141. Schmitt (Das internationalrechtliche Verbrechen des Angriffkrieges), supra note 75. See 
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promote practical goals and achieve practical results […].”144 None of 
this is to say that Schmitt did not support the general war aims of the 
Regime, i.e. that war was necessary for Germany to break out of its small-territorial 
state status. What this implied was a matter of opinion where 
scholarship could play a role. It has to be recognized that there was some 
measure of debate and intellectual freedom in the Third Reich. It was a 
matter of having protection from somewhere within the Regime. Schmitt 
had Görings’s protection. In 1936 the desire of Schmitt’s SS enemies had 
been to drive him out of academic life altogether. Heydrich and Himmler 
continued personally to try to win over Göring. However, he remained 
supportive of Schmitt till the end.145 
At another point Schmitt accepts that the intellectual habitus of the 
scholar is to further knowledge and, as well, the exchange of opinion. 
There is a danger that in times of open or latent civil war every word will 
be at once changed into a propaganda slogan. He accepts that every author 
is responsible for every idle word, but objects that in legal terms it had 
been decided at Nuremberg that not even Hitler’s Mein Kampf constituted 
criminal planning as such.146 At the same time Schmitt was thoroughly 
within the German side of the war. There is, of course, in particular, 
Schmitt’s already noted adoption of the Soviet-German Agreement of 
September 1939 concerning spheres of influence, which clearly endorses 
the extinction of Poland. One can say that Schmitt’s distinction between 
support for a regime and responsibility of the scholar meant that he thought 
he had a better idea as to what the Regime should be trying to achieve. 
Schmitt’s responsibility in the matter of Hitler’s foreign policy is more 
usefully seen in terms of reflection on how Schmitt thought his theory of 
law, as applied to international law, was supposed to have any constructive 
influence, whether in the sense of advice, solicited or not, on Hitler. 
This question calls for a consideration of his views of the power-holders 
in the Regime alongside his views of the nature of Law as a 
Konkretesordnungsdenken as opposed to the hated Normativismus of the 
Liberals. Once again, it is embarrassing to read of Schmitt’s view of powerholders 
in 1947, given that he is one of the most celebrated proponents of 
the authoritarian state, and given that his theory of Konkretesordnungsdenken 
is linked to his theory of decisionism, which supposes the authority 
of the Leader. Nonetheless, the interest of the analysis offered here is to 
determine not simply the integrity of Schmitt, in a personal sense (threatened 
with trial, why should he incriminate himself) but also the integrity 
of his system of thought, which is, in Western international law terms, 
original and attempts to provide an alternative to the monolith of 
liberal-democratic international law. 
 
144. Bendersky, supra note 138, at 115. 
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When Schmitt says that he deliberately kept his distance from the real 
center of power (Hitler and his circle) that he “was prompted by the general 
dread of power holders and their cohorts, and the abiding conviction that 
discussions with them are unproductive […].”147 this is contradicted by 
history. Yet another example of association is the fact that he sent a copy 
of his essay Die Wendung zum diskriminierenden Kriegsbegriff to 
Ribbentrop, who replied that he would be very pleased to find the time to 
read what Schmitt had to say on such an important theme in a free hour.148 
However, this change of tune by Schmitt is not as significant theoretically 
as his apparent rejection of the whole decisionist approach to law, 
which is explicit in his criticism of the definition of the position of the 
Chief of the Reich Chancellery, Martin Bormann. Schmitt contrasts the 
minimum which can be expected in the functioning of public authorities 
to adhere to forms and norms and what he calls a certain legality of 
methods, in the French and German sense of the word. “Legality is the 
functioning modus of every state bureaucracy […].”149 Yet characteristic 
of the Hitler Regime is its completely personalized rule of secret orders 
and secret laws, central to the arcana of the Hitler regime.150 Hitler is 
characterized as having 
only the deepest hatred for any stipulations through forms or even institutions […]. 
His deliberative subjectiveness and therewith the fundamental abnormality of his 
regime is really unprecedented […] – a system that knew no binding forms and 
institutions, in which everything it did or announced was always “subject to 
change.” The fundamental irreconcilability of the omnipotence of the Fuehrer and 
the legalizing order of the state was thus perhaps most obvious in the position of 
the Chief of the Reich Chancellery […].”151 
This is a fundamental concession by Schmitt, and if it cannot be qualified 
it undermines the integrity of his approach to international law, given the 
place which Schmitt accords to the Leader.152 One need only recollect the 
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importance of the act of the Führer as a defense against Powers which 
are foreign to the space and which do not rest on the völkische principle.153 
Hitler’s aversion to Normativism is crucial both to his entire foreign policy 
and to his appeal to Germans as a radical intellectual. As has been seen, 
the heart of the concept of Konkretesrechtsdenken in international law is 
that the law must, somehow, reflect the concrete life of Peoples. Yet it is 
in Der Führer schüzt das Recht that Schmitt claims 
[t]he judgeship of the Führer springs from the same legal source from which springs 
all the Law of the People. In the case of greatest necessity the supreme Law protects 
itself and appears as the highest standard of judicially vengeful realization of this 
Law. All Law stems from the right of life of the People […].”154 
This aspect of Schmitt’s thinking, given his recantation in 1947, has to be 
explored more fully in the context of the conduct of foreign policy and 
the place of international law. 
 
3.3. Hitler as a model for Schmitt, the theorist of legal authority 
 
While it is not the object of this paper to do more than explain in general 
outline Schmitt’s approach to international law in the period 1933–45, 
something has to be said of the hope which Schmitt obviously had for 
Hitler, well advised by Schmitt. Where is there the common ground? 
The hostility to liberal democracy is an essential part of the Nazi 
Weltanschauung. The reason for Schmitt’s willingness to resort to the 
authoritarian rather than the liberal state had to do with his fear of and 
contempt for liberal middle class politics. It lacked the grandeur and 
heroism of the old order of the monarchy, the state civil service and the 
army. It was torn by endless intrigues over the balancing of so-called 
interests of particular groupings that were tearing the state apart. The State 
(i.e. the Army and the Civil Service) Schmitt regarded as having disintegrated 
with the defeat of 1918 and the abdication of the Monarchy. 
The State came to be restored by the Nazi Movement with its Leader. 
The Movement and the Leader restored the German State.155 However, a 
commitment to such a leader as Hitler was no accident. Hitler was a reflection 
of numerous characteristics of inter-war Germany that Schmitt also 
reflected.156 The similarities are innumerable. 
Hitler’s radicalism was attractive precisely because of his hostility to 
and indifference to all existing power relations, including the international 
constraints that appeared to be imposed upon Germany. It was not only 
Schmitt but also Hitler who triumphed at the idea that a decision could 
be taken out of nothing. As Fest puts it, Hitler 
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knew nothing of the sense or rightness of what had become established. While other 
statesmen took account of the reality of existing power relations, he began from 
an empty surface. So he constructed Europe and the World from a new starting 
point; he came from nothing and he thought from nothing.157 
This runs parallel to Schmitt’s focus upon the State of Exception, where 
the state suspends the whole of the existing legal order. The Decision 
(Entscheidung) makes itself free from any normative boundedness and is 
Absolute.158 The Decision itself is born out of nothing, considered from 
the normative perspective. From the aspect of content every moment of 
decision is something new and strange (Fremdes).159 The thinking of 
Schmitt and Hitler run parallel, above all in their radicality, even if we 
see that, possibly, Schmitt may not have intended this to go so far in 
international relations. 
It is essential to penetrate the language of Weltanschauung and 
Konkretesrechtsdenken to the nature of the radicalism underlying it. I have 
attempted to introduce Jaspers in order to argue that the former concept 
is deeply rooted in the radical subjectivism of German idealism. With 
respect to Schmitt’s legal theory this theme is particularly focused on the 
deep anxiety which has afflicted the German People about the instability 
of its place in any European order of Peoples. The crucial existential 
element in his thought about the Volk has been seen to have very close 
parallels to Hegel. It is possible to draw a direct line between a passage 
of the Concept of the Political and a passage of Hegel’s Philosophy of 
Right to illustrate the nature of an existential conflict between peoples. So, 
Schmitt says that normal moral standards could never justify killing. States, 
however, come inevitably into mortal conflict with one another where their 
way of life is threatened. All of these deliberations are in the context of 
a theoretical discussion of war and the impossibility of limiting it – a main 
ground of Schmitt’s opposition to the English and French international 
lawyers whom he discusses. Schmitt says: 
War, the readiness of combatants to die, the physical killing of human beings who 
belong on the side of the enemy – all of this has no normative meaning, but an 
existential meaning only […]. There exists no rational purpose, no norm, no matter 
how true […] no legitimacy nor legality which could justify men killing each other 
for this reason. If such physical destruction of human life is not motivated by an 
existential threat to one’s way of life, then it cannot be justified […].”160 
Hegel’s parallel remarks are set within a context of the inevitability of war 
among states, that is, a war which is traditional not total. Hegel states: 
 
157. Id., at 1029. 
158. C. Schmitt, Politische Theologie. Vier Kapitel zur Lehre von der Souveränität, at 19 (1934). 
159. Id., at 42. 
160. C. Schmitt, The Concept of the Political (Translation, Introduction, and Notes by G. 
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The welfare of a state has claims to recognition totally different from those of the 
welfare of the individual. The ethical substance, the state, has its determinate being, 
i.e. its right, directly embodied in something existent, something not abstract but 
concrete, and the principle of its conduct and behavior can only be this concrete 
existent and not one of the many universal thoughts supposed to be moral 
commands […].161 
In the 1920s Schmitt prepares the ground for the radicalism of his perspective 
with respect to the Volk.162 Schmitt’s vision of Germany goes back 
to the extreme conflicts of the German peasant War and the Wars of 
Religion. Conflict till death is supposed to be a reality. We are bound to 
one another in the state by the fact that it can afford us the occasion for 
a meaningful death, a constant in German history.163 In the context of post 
1918 Germany, the famous civil war of the 20th century, following the 
Russian revolution, gave Schmitt the choice of national or class conflict 
as myths with which to ‘glorify’ violence or ‘irrationality.’164 Schmitt 
distinguishes himself from what he sees as the contemplative dialectic of 
Hegel, when he describes the destruction of the bourgeois liberal world 
in his work on parliamentarianism. He follows directly Sorel’s reflections 
on violence and reverts to his concept of myth, beyond any rational deliberation, 
in order to place nationalism above communism: “From the depths 
of a true Life-instinct, not from mere reasoning or calculation, arises great 
enthusiasm, great moral decisions and great myths […].”165 The vital 
strength of the People means the superiority of the national over the class 
myth shown by the victory in Italy of Sorel’s pupil, Mussolini.166 
 
161. G.W.F. Hegel, Philosophy of Right (Translation with notes by T.M. Knox) (1967), at 
para. 337–340. See M. Kaufmann, Recht ohne Regel? Die philosophischen Prinzipien in 
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See also J. Rückert, Der Rechtsbegriff der Deutschen Rechtsgeschichte in der NS-Zeit: 
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der NS-Zeit (The Concept of Legal History in the National Socialism Period) (1995), at 
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What is problematic for any international order is the subjective quality 
of this construction. The cult of irrationality is built into the concept of 
Weltanschauung. It means for Schmitt precisely that it does not matter 
whether what is believed is true, only that it should lend strength to the 
political act. Concretely this means a belief in the historical destiny of a 
People. This is developed further after 1933 in Staat Bewegung Volk, where 
Schmitt insists that the unifying force of the myth require the leadership 
of the Party and Führer to give unity to the People, the latter being understood 
passively.167 Clearly Schmitt is putting life forms (Lebensformen), 
essentially ethnic difference, above a parliamentary interest politics, where 
differences could be resolved through compromise. This is not simply 
because of an aggressive anthropology, but also because of Schmitt’s 
assumption that basic concepts such as Freedom, Rechtstaat and 
Democracy could only have their precise meaning from a concrete 
antithesis.168 In the end Schmitt is dissolving all constitutional forms into 
one final source of legitimacy in the self-determining will of the People, 
so that the Volk is understood existentially.169 Its active status, as has been 
seen, depends entirely upon the Führer. 
What is crucial is that, beyond generalities about Volkstümlichkeit, 
Schmitt is professing a radical anthropology of a society in an advanced 
state of disintegration due to evil, meaning by that, aggressive, exploitative, 
untrustworthy/unreliable conduct that induces an equally radical 
anxiety and sense of threat in social relations. The question is whether or 
how this can be overcome, short of a miracle. The answer is that a 
dictatorship is necessary to overcome moral chaos. As Kaufmann remarks, 
this authoritarian state will set itself above any constitutional restraints, 
as it is whipped up into an enthusiastic crowd held together by myth and 
dramatic action. It will refuse any explanation in its march to destroy 
so-called ‘staatszerstörenden Kräfte’ (forces destructive of the state).170 
Therefore there is no saving objectivity for international law in institutionalized 
konkretes Rechtsdenken. For Schmitt his theory receives 
further support from a French source, the constitutional theorist, Hauriou. 
The latter, in turn, draws upon Durkheim and Duguit. The objective 
legal norm is for Hauriou precisely the reflection of a perspective 
(Widerspiegelung einer Anschauung) from a particular social milieu.171 In 
his case he was thinking primarily of the esprit de corps of the Conseil 
d’Etat. Hauriou does not accept simply the doctrine that the legal norm, 
of itself, shapes the law. One has to consider the manner in which the legal 
system is grounded. The leading idea (Leitidee) of an institution is 
something objective, present in the institution, an agreed declaration of 
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community (übereinstimmende Bekundungen von Gemeinsamkeit), which 
does have a particular group within the community as the carrier of the 
idea.172 Whatever force the legal idea may have comes from the legal 
substance of family, the state or the army. Out of their particular ideas a 
rule of law may emerge. For the international lawyer, i.e. Schmitt, it is 
seen as possible to adapt Hauriou’s ideas by looking to the Volk that is 
itself held in legal form by the Führer.173 It is the leading idea of the Volk 
which the regional power, Germany, has to protect against outside intervention. 
Kaufmann, who is making these scholarly connections, quotes 
here from the essay on the Reichsbegriff. This Reich is defined in terms 
of a Grossraum which is ruled by a particular Weltanschauung, itself 
guaranteed by a People equal to the task.174 After explaining how Hitler 
understood the same ideas, it will be necessary to return, in a last section, 
to the question whether one can distinguish Schmitt’s position from 
‘full-blooded’ National Socialism. 
What will be suggested about Hitler concerns his existential appeal, 
his radicality, how this affected his attitude to rules, law and with it, 
European order and international law. Lebensraum (living space) rather 
than Grossraum was Hitler’s key revolutionary concept with which to 
change Germany’s small territorial state status. The interest of this analysis 
has to be confined to one question: how far the attractiveness of Hitler 
for a figure such as Schmitt implicates the picture of the latter as an 
international lawyer and makes out of him a National Socialist international 
lawyer. 
The primary difficulty is how can a supposedly existentialist perspective 
be compatible with any normative perspective? Must Schmitt not have 
realized that to put the decision before the norm was to express, in Hitler’s 
case, a revolutionary dimension which was not compatible with Schmitt’s 
vision of Germany as a regional power, with rights equal to other regional 
powers? Hitler’s fierce energy and radicality he attributed himself to being 
completely without resources or position, someone that had to create 
everything for himself out of nothing. Hence Hitler’s approach to the valid 
rules of the game was not simply the defiance of social convention found 
with Gregor Strasser or Joseph Göbbels. Hitler had about him the radical 
subjectivity which Schmitt notices in 1947, the unwillingness to tolerate 
any idea above himself, with a tendency to ignore all apparently objective 
restraints.175 In the atmosphere of acute anxiety that the middle classes 
experienced after 1918, Hitler played deliberately the theme that ‘nothing 
has any longer an anchor.’ The intensity of anxiety is such that whole 
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masses of people feel a catastrophic power of uncertainty. Hitler knew to 
incorporate in himself the fears of the Germans: “The thinking of our 
People is uneasy and hasty. Life itself is completely torn apart […].”176 
This led Hitler not to a search for inner authenticity (Echtheit), but to a 
belief in such total social disintegration that life had to be a struggle of 
all against all. Law, morality, humanity, or whatever, had to give way to 
the relentless law of nature that was the rage for self-preservation. In 
international relations this meant the struggle of peoples for Lebensraum 
(Lebenskampf der Völker). This struggle experienced the most fanatical 
radicality, with the maximum of ruthlessness, where no restraints existed 
between war and annihilation.177 It is not easy to gather how Schmitt could 
have seen such existentialism as capable of restoring, as he seemed to 
wish, the traditional Europe-limited struggles for Great Power status.178 
In such a radical perspective Hitler never understood the concept of 
Lebensraum as a simple claim to a limited regional status for Germany. 
It was also not simply a rational device to provide Germany with needed 
natural resources. It was a test for the Germans on their way to a world 
leadership and domination. Over against the Versailles System and the 
pre-1914 international order in which Germany found itself, Lebensraum 
meant the complete overthrow of Germany’s European environment, which 
could only limit and restrict it. Hitler’s determination to dominate and 
resettle the Russian heartland meant a belief in the possibility of overturning 
the migrations of peoples that were thousands of years past. An 
absolute radicality of the project was to be combined with an equally 
fanatical disregard in the implementation of the project. As became 
obvious by the end of World War II, Hitler’s plans were carried out with 
an unprecedented rigor. The catastrophic sense of existential anxiety that 
grounded his plans provoked their execution in a manner that reached 
apocalyptic levels of horror.179 It is difficult to see how a serious political 
analyst cannot have realized, and therefore have acquiesced, in the 
relentless dynamic with which the concepts of Leader, People and 
Lebensraum, or Grossraum were laden. The absence of a clear dividing 
line, where such concepts are rooted in radical instability of social 
structures, is bound to leave the legal analyst wondering what can, in 
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retrospect, be extracted from a Schmittian project which appears a mixture 
of extreme naiveté and irresponsibility.180 This conclusion cannot be left 
standing without a word for the thesis that Schmitt had the intention to 
provide a limited alternative project to Hitler’s which he hoped could 
exercise influence.181 
  
3.4. Schmitt as a conservative revolutionary  
 
A stalwart defense of Schmitt’s relationship to the National Socialist 
Regime could be in terms that he is to be seen as a conservative revolutionary, 
or even as a traditional German nationalist, part of a class of people 
who were in more or less effective coalition with the Nazis until the 
beginning of 1938. This is the time when von Ribbentrop at the Foreign 
Ministry replaced von Neurath and Keitel replaced von Blomberg and 
von Fritsch, at the head of the Army. These removals followed their 
unenthusiastic response to Hitler’s explanation of his intentions to undertake 
aggressive war at a Secret Conference of the 5th November 1937. 
With this final Putsch Hitler considered he had effectively broken the 
power of the traditional pillars or Stände of the Prussian German state, 
the Civil Service and the Officer Corps of the Army.182 Schmitt is well 
known to have been toppled from his official positions about a year earlier, 
in December 1936, when Himmler, Heydrich, and the SS attacked him as 
an opportunist, not really committed to the Regime ideology of anti- 
Semitism, and still influenced by catholic ideas of political society.183 So, 
Schmitt wrote Völkerrechtliche Grossraumordnung when he had no official 
position in the Regime and was not, on the face of it, doing more than 
accepting invitations to give academic lectures, in this case, at the Kiel 
Institute of International Law in April 1939. 
Did the Regime regard Schmitt’s international law writing, particularly 
the Völkerrechtliche Grossraumordnung, as an acceptable continuation of 
the Conservative alliance? What was the reaction of the regime, in ideological 
terms, to Schmitt’s Grossraum? Schmoeckel claims that Schmitt’s 
theory of Grossraumordnung was tied to the ideology of Nazi Germany 
and to the present world war, which was to give it its Nomos. The sheer 
vagueness of the concept must have suited the Regime, and the claim to 
an equal status with an American Grossraum favored an expansionist 
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foreign policy. By offering a theory for a policy of expansion, Schmitt 
strengthened an otherwise chaotic discussion of an eastern policy. Schmitt 
wanted to work on the shape of the coming war just as much as any 
apologist of international legal Unrecht. He did not make himself legally 
responsible for aggressive war, but he belongs among those whom Thomas 
Mann accuses of providing a foundation for the Regime.184 Schmoeckel 
concludes these speculations with the remark that “[i]t cannot, therefore, 
be excluded that the Grossraum doctrine contributed to put to sleep the 
consciousness of illegality in Germany.”185 
This analysis is accompanied by the remarkable judgement that radical 
lack of clarity existed within the Regime about what its Eastern policy 
was, even as the war progressed. Schmoeckel cites the views of Himmler, 
Göbbels, Rosenberg, and others as if their opinions were all of the same 
value in an inconclusive academic discussion.186 It is much more realistic 
to recognize that only a few people’s opinions matter. Himmler comes first, 
with his self-assumed responsibility for overseeing the extermination of 
Jews and numerous Slav populations, with a view to a systematic resettlement 
of Germans in the whole, vast Eurasian landmass which was to 
be the foundation of a new Euro-Asiatic Gross Reich. In Himmler’s 
operational planning, following on the overall territorial aims of the 
Wehrmacht, there was no lack of clarity.187 It is equally notorious that Hitler 
was perfectly clear in his intentions, as he was to carry them out, towards 
the East.188 
The difficulty with Schmoeckel’s analysis is probably that it is more 
legal than historical. He makes an elaborate investigation of all the legal 
writing subsequent to Schmitt’s own intervention to see whether any 
correspondence can be reached as to the use of the key words, Raum, 
Reich, Grossraum, Politische Idee, Grossraumordnung, etc. He divides 
approaches into those which rely more upon the state as a starting point 
and those which rely upon the Volk, assuming that Schmitt himself more 
favored the former concept. This is because Schmitt was not willing to 
develop a full racial theory of Law and continued to maintain the need of 
a place for the State in social organization. Schmoeckel’s study is comprehensive 
but it is legal, at least in the sense of stressing logical analysis. 
He is trying, in the first German attempt of its kind, to take the heat out 
of the discussion of such a theme as Schmitt’s international law theory 
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by applying standards of orthodox legal scholarship to his analysis. 
However, the result lacks focus on those figures who are representative 
of the Regime, and whose approval or disapproval would indicate how 
close to the Regime Schmitt actually was.189 
Könen attempts an apology of Schmitt in terms that his international 
law writing. Particularly Die Völkerrechtliche Grossraumordnung was a 
late leftover of the conservative or Christian or nationalist elements which 
had originally attempted to steer the Regime when, for instance, von Papen 
was appointed vice-chancellor in 1933. He focuses upon those attacks from 
within the SS, and the Regime generally, which were politically significant. 
This approach reveals that by summer 1941 Schmitt could not help 
but realize that he was never going to influence events in his direction. 
SS Führer Werner Best, a very high ranking official in occupied Denmark, 
insisted upon a völkische Grossraumordnung, which is related to the 
Weltanschauung of Peoples as “überpersönlichen, überzeitlichen 
Gesamtwesenheiten” (somehow superpersonal, beyond time as collective 
entities).190 Instead of an international law Grossraumordnung, one must 
speak of a völkische order. It was such attacks that Schmitt responded to 
with his additions in the later editions. Firstly he added the section “Reich 
und Raum.” This led to a further attack from Best, insisting again upon 
his völkische Ordnung. He sees in the connection that Schmitt makes with 
the Christian-European international law of the 16th century, a great political 
danger. Schmitt’s concept of international law could mean that what 
had been subjects of the former international legal order might now claim 
equality as sovereign partners with the Leading People, and even bring 
their international law ties with that People to an end. Therewith Schmitt 
is branded as someone who tries to undermine the ‘lebensgezsetzlich’ (life-legislated) 
legitimated German claim to leadership.191 
SS Führer Höhn joined in the attack, arguing as well that Schmitt’s 
theory of non-intervention could be interpreted not merely outwards 
against interventions by foreign Great Powers, but also against the Leading 
People, the Germans, who would equally be prohibited from intervening 
in other Grossräume.192 The principle of non-intervention may have a role 
in the foundation of a Grossraum, but must not later be allowed to lead 
to the defeat of völkische particularity. The Grossraum must be able to 
serve the Lebensgesetzlichkeit of Peoples and overcome artificial limitations. 
The function of National Socialist legal doctrine must be to 
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emphasize that the political fighting concept of Grossraum is concerned 
with the claim to a more extended Lebensraum, which takes account of 
the needs of existence of European Peoples. With the destruction of 
English and French political and military chains, this new political order 
of Europe, based on the Lebensrechten der Völker, recognizes the need for 
new structuring of Space in accordance with the Life and Performancedrive 
of Peoples. Indeed a further danger of drawing on a concept of Law 
taken from the Monroe Doctrine is that the very idea of non-intervention 
attaches to an individualist concept of the state, which seeks to minimize 
the intervention of the state. A true Grossraum principle must be drawn 
from the spirit of a politically awakened People.193 
These criticisms of 1940 and 1941 were accompanied by one from the 
Rosenberg Office on 16th April 1941, which stated that it accepted 
Schmitt’s theory of Grossraum positively, but with qualifications.194 These 
attached to the use of the word Reich for the German Grossraumordnung. 
This difficult concept, if applied to the political order that the Reich leads, 
could entail such a level of abstraction as to be quite separated from the 
German People.195 Schmitt is taken by Könen to have recognized at this 
point that all was lost. He complained to a friend about the lack of a real 
public and the excommunication of intelligence. He brought out one 
last edition in July 1941, with a new chapter, “Raumbegriff in der 
Rechtswissenschaft.” He stated in the forward that a new international 
law concept with a global political significance is likely to become a slogan 
or a term of abuse.196 
After attempting to place Schmitt in a very broadly European and 
Christian movement of thought throughout the 1920s and 1930s, Könen 
ends on a very controversial note that needs to be explored. He claims 
there is a definite message in these terms for the present, which necessitates 
some final, if brief, mention of what was the conservative revolutionary 
spirit. Könen claims that the heart of the Conservative Revolution 
was opposition to the prognosticated collapse of Western civilization, in 
particular the theses of Oswald Spengler, in his Decline of the West.197 The 
movement understood itself as the counter-revolution to ‘1789’ and wished 
to establish on the continent of Europe a Christian Reich. They sought to 
achieve this through the construction of a spiritual basis for a lasting 
institutional foundation for human existence, i.e. one that did not rest 
simply on an interest-based democratic politics.198 The attempts to construct 
a spiritual concept of People, with a place for inspired Leadership 
would fall within this more general framework. Individualist, materialist 
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democracy can bring nothing but pork barrel ‘dealing’ politics, for the 
most part completely blocked, inactive and stagnant. Schmitt was a key 
figure in this movement because of his sharp criticism of the liberal distinction 
between state and society and its roots in humanism, rationalism, 
and the Enlightenment. Instead he offered a status (Stand) oriented 
concrete order, which is most clearly set out in Staat, Bewegung, Volk.199 
It has been seen how Schmitt attached to the Führer and the Nazi Party 
the responsibility for making up the deficiencies of the Hegelian state, in 
particular the directionless Army and Civil Service. It has also been seen 
how Hitler disposed of this assigned role. The expectation which Könen 
still places on the Conservative Revolution for the present time is one, 
albeit limited, way in which one might consider the continued relevance 
of the Schmittian international law vision in the present era of triumphant 
liberalism, which is supposed to mark the End of History. 
Könen stresses the degree to which Schmitt’s international law concept 
was primarily rooted in a European tradition of the subject, the ius 
publicum Europaeum. This is supposed to signify that Europe as a cultural 
entity could still be developed as a project in opposition to the rampant 
individualist materialism of Anglo-American democracy. He quotes 
Christian Social Union (Bavarian) political opinion that the old Reich (The 
Holy Roman Empire) could be a model for a common European home, in 
which the regions of Europe related to one another in quite a lose structure. 
200 If this Europe is to be more than a mere uniform market, it should 
be able to reconnect with pre-national Europe. As such Europe could be 
more than merely an economic model.201 Another thinker, the Karlsruhe 
cultural philosopher, Peter Sloterdijk is well known in America for his 
monumental Critique of Cynical Reason.202 He is taken to suggest that 
the way to overcome a momentary ‘Reichslosigkeit’ (absence of the Reich) 
is through a continuation of the centuries-old struggle between modernisation- 
globalisation and conservationist anti-global forces. The motive of 
the Conservative Revolution, two to three generations ago, in Catholic 
Middle and Southern Europe, has a great future now in its religious, 
cultural, and regionalist aspirations. Globalization is bursting asunder the 
quasi-religious nation state that dominated Europe since the 19th century. 
Europe as an idea can be a response. For this it has to develop again the 
old concept of Reich. A European is someone who can undertake to 
redevelop this concept for the present day.203 
Whether or not Schmitt really envisaged his concept of Reich in such 
European terms, a reactivation of a pre-national idea of the old Empire is 
most doubtful. Schmoeckel sees the central historical roots of Schmitt’s 
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concept of Reich in his response to the work of Christoph Steding, Das 
Reich und die Krankheit der europäischen Kultur (The Reich and the 
sickness of European culture) a part of the debate about how to resist 
Spenglerian decadence, especially as represented by liberal democracy.204 
A Reich has to be founded not on ideas of federalism or confederation, 
but on a spiritual basis. Political forms must concretize objective standards 
of morality and reason.205 This places the focus on the quality of the 
spiritual critique that Schmitt, supposedly as a Conservative Revolutionary, 
was able to make of National Socialism. However, in a study which is 
devoted to a very sympathetic analysis of the Conservation Revolution’s 
project for Christian Europe, Faber is categorical that Schmitt had no place 
in this current of thought during the Third Reich. Schmitt clearly envisaged 
a hegemonic role for Germany as leader of what is still a Europe of 
the nations.206 After the war it may have been another matter for Schmitt. 
Faber refers to an article in 1950 entitled Raum und Rom in which Schmitt 
says the words are the same.207 Finally, a contemporary of Schmitt’s who 
regarded himself as a conservative revolutionary, with a project of a united 
Christian Europe, also puts Schmitt out of this company. In his focus on 
the destruction of the moral elements of German society by the Nazis, 
Rauschning places Schmitt foremost among those who blocked any 
possibility for moral restraint. Schmitt is seen to propose a theory of 
Leadership whose authority rested upon race and violence.208 
This negative conclusion is consistent with the critique of the foundations 
that have been made of Schmitt’s own project for a European order. 
They rest upon Volk, Führer, and Reich. These ideas implicate him in the 
disasters of the Reich. His responsibility is limited because this Reich 
was a more plural entity than might sometimes be realized. However, all 
the international lawyer seems to be left with is Schmitt’s very sharp 
negative critique of Anglo-American international law. If this were to be 
developed further through Schmitt’s work then some more favorable 
interpretation would have to be put on his liberalism-critique than it has 
been possible to give in this study. 
 
204. Schmoeckel, supra note 7, at 91–95. 
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project was for a German supremacy, with England excluded from Europe. The American 
defeat of Germany meant, precisely, a restoration of the 1918–1919 liberal democratic 
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